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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
* * * * * * 
DANIEL S. GARNER and SHERRI JO ) 
GARNER husband and wife; NOLA GARNER, ) 
a widow and NOLA GARNER as trustee of the ) 
NOLA GARNER LIVING TRUST, dated 7-29-07, ) 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
BRAD POVEY and LEIZA POVEY, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
HAL J. DEAN and MARLENE T. DEAN, 
husband and wife, DOUGLAS K. VIEHWEG and 
SHARON C. VIEHWEG, husband and wife, 
JEFFREY J. NEIGUM and KATHLEEN A. 
NEIGUM as trustees of the JEFFREY J. 
NEIGUM and KATHLEEN A. NEIGUM 
REVOCABLE TRUST, dated 9-17-04; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a foreign title insurer with an Idaho certificate 
of authority; and FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
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DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO 
Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner, 
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow; 
and Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola 
Gamer Living Trust, dated Ju1y 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon 
C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and KathleenA. Neigum, as 
Trustees ofthe Jeffery J. Neigum and 
Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust, 
dated September 172004; Jeffery J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband 
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey, 
husband and wife; First American Title 
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title 
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of 
Authority; and First American Title 
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-342 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS 
Idaho R. CIV. P.54(d)(6) 
The plaintiffs, Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner, husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a 
widow; and Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola Garner Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007 
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(Garners), through counsel, Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA, respectfully submit this 
Motion to Disallow Costs pursuant to Rule 54(d)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This 
motion is supported by the argument below, the second affidavit of Daniel S. Gamer, and the 
affidavit of Jeffrey D. Brunson. 
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 1980s, the defendant Garners have routinely accessed their property west of 
the Twin Lakes Canal (Garner property) via what has been commonly described in this litigation 
as the Northern Road. The Garners have sporadically accessed their property via the N eigum 
Driveway. During a period oftime from 1990 to 1992, the Poveys owned the servient estate 
through which the Northern Roadway passes. The Poveys sold the servient estate prior to the 
commencement of this lawsuit. In late May 2008, the Viehwegs, successors to the Poveys' 
interest in the servient estate, obstructed access to the Garner property via the Northern Roadway 
by erecting a fence across it. The Viehwegs and First American Title Company took the position 
that the Garners did not have legal access to their property via the Northern Roadway. Faced 
with the prospect oflosing effective access to their property, the Garners conducted extensive 
investigation and an evaluation to determine what judicial relief was available to them. In the 
course of this process, the Garners concluded that certain acts and omissions by the Poveys, 
including the manner in which the Poveys transferred the servient estate to the Deans, Neigums, 
and Viehwegs, were at the heart of the plight in which the Garners found themselves. Thus, the 
Garners named the Poveys as defendants in the lawsuit. 
At the time the Garners sought leave from the Court to amend their complaint, the Poveys 
moved to dismiss the Garners' proposed second amended complaint. The parties briefed the 
issues, and the Court heard oral argument from counsel. The Court denied the Poveys' motion to 
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dismiss and specifically found that the Garners had made colorable claims of easement 
interference and breach ofwalTanty. (Decision and Order on Povey Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss Amended Complaint at 8.) Shortly after the Court denied the Poveys' motion to 
dismiss, counsel for the Deans, Neigums, aIld Viehwegs reached out to counsel for the Garners 
in an effort to reach settlement. Complex settlement negotiations between the Garners and the 
Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs commenced in April 2009. During the settlement negotiations, 
the Poveys gave notice of depositions of the Garners to be held on June 2 and June 3. On the eve 
of the depositions, counsel for the Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs requested that the Poveys 
cancel or postpone the depositions. The basis for this request was that the Deans, N eigums, and 
Viehwegs were close to reaching settlement with the Garners. As indicated in the affidavit of 
Blake S. Atkin, the depositions were not canceled. Following the depositions, tl1e Garners 
continued active settlement negotiations with the Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs. After months 
of negotiation, the Garners reached a settlement agreement with the Deans, Neigums, Viehwegs, 
and First American Title Company in late September 2009. Under the agreement, the Garners 
obtained an assurance that they would have legal access to their property via a surveyed and 
recorded easement. Several days prior to the exe<;ution of the settlement agreement, on 
September 1, the Poveys moved for summary judgment. On.October 27,2009, the Court issued 
its memorandum decision granting the Poveys' motion for summary judgment. The Poveys 
subsequently filed and served a copy of their Memorandum of Costs and Fees on November 9, 
2009. For the reasons stated below, the Court should disallow entirely the attorney fees claimed 
by the Poveys. Also, it should disallow the costs claimed by the Poveys to the extent those costs 
are unreasonably incurred. 
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ARGUMENT 
The Court should deny the Poveys' request for attorney fees entirely because no contract, 
statute, rule of civil procedure, or other provision provides a basis for this Court to award 
attorney fees to the Poveys in thjs case. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e)(1) states: 
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the 
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or 
parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or 
contract. Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be 
awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the 
case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation ... , 
IDAHO R. ClV. P. 54(e)(l). In their memorandum of costs and fees, the Poveys cite two bases for 
an award of attorney fees: Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and Idaho Code § 12-121. See Poveys' Mem. 
Costs and Fees at 2-5. The Poveys are not entitled to an award of attorney fees under § 12-
120(3) because there is no commercial transaction at issue in this lawsuit, and even ifthere were 
a commercial transaction, it was not the basis of the Garners' claims on which the Poveys 
prevailed. Likewise, the Poveys are not entitled to an award of attorney fees under § 12-121 
because the Garners pursued their claims in good "faith with a reasonable basis in law and fact. 
." 
See Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. State o/Idaho, 132 Idaho 673, 677-78, 978 P.2d 233, 237-
38 (1999). 
I. The Poveys are not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
a. There is no commercial transaction at issue in this iawsuit. 
Nola Garner's ownership of property at issue in this lawsuit is traceable to her purchase 
from the Poveys in 1992. However, that purchase was not a commercial transaction for purposes 
of § 12-120(3) analysis. In considering § 12-120 attorney fee claims, the Supreme Court of 
Idaho has recognized that "the term commercial transaction is not generally applied to real estate 
transactions, or to issues involving the ownership of property." Treasure Valley, 132 Idaho at 
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677,978 P.2d at 237 (1999).1 If Gary's and Nola's purchase of real property from the Poveys 
qualifies as a "transaction" at all, it was indisputably a real estate transaction, not a commercial 
transaction. Thus, there is no basis for applying § 12-120(3). As discussed further below, even 
if the Court were to deem the sale of real estate from the Poveys to Nola Gamer in 1992 a 
commercial transaction, that transaction was so remotely connected to the issues litigated in this 
case that it could not provide the basis for awarding attorney fees under § 12-120(3). 
The Poveys make much ado of the fact that in their complaint, the Garners characterized 
Nola's and Gary's acquisition of property from the Poveys in 1992 as a commercial transaction. 
This characterization was nothing more than an attempt by the Garners to exhaust every 
conceivable and alternative basis for recovery at the complaint stage, and, as this Court has 
already recognized in this case, pleading in the alternative is expressly allowed under Rule 8 of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. (Decision and Order on Povey Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss Amended Complaint at 5-6.) In light of Treasure Valley, cited above, § 12-120 does not 
apply. Moreover, after describing Nola's and Gary's purchase of property from the Poveys as a 
commercial transaction in their complaint, the Garners never styled their claims as grounded in a 
commercial transaction in further stages of the litigation in the fashion customary of § 12-120 
situations.2 Finally, it must be noted that in their answer to the Garners' complaint, the Poveys 
denied that Nola's and Gary's 1992 purchase from the Poveys was a commercial transaction.3 It 
would be illogical and arbitrary for the Court to find a commercial transaction based on how the 
Garners pled the issue in their complaint when the Poveys, who now readily embrace the 
I See also C & G v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763 25 P.3d 82 (2001)(where issue was a determination of rights in an 
easement, attorney fees under § 12-120(3) were not appropriate). 
2 The relevance the 1992 sale has to the Garners' claims is that it was the method by which Nola acquired her 
interest in the property at issue in this case. 
3 The Poveys denied paragraph 37 of the Garners' second amended complaint, which contains the allegation that the 
1992 purchase of real estate was a commercial transaction. 
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commercial transaction concept, denied there was a commercial transaction when they answered 
the Garners' complaint. 
b. Even if the real estate transaction between Gary and Nola and the Poveys 
was a commercial transaction, it was not the gravamen of the lawsuit. 
Although the Poveys are the prevailing party with respect to the claims asserted against 
them4, the specific grounds that provide for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 
12-120(3) do not exist in this case. The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled frequently on the issue 
of awarding attorney fees under § 12-120(3) and it has consistently applied the same rules. "[I]n 
any civil action to recover ... in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, 
the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court." Brower v. 
E.l DuPont De Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 783, 792 P.2d 345,348 (1990). However, "the 
award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a commercial transaction is remotely 
connected with the case." !d. at 784, 349; Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131 
Idaho 657,663,962 P.2d 1041, 1047 (1998). Rather, "[t]he critical test is whether the 
commercial transaction comprises the gravamen o/the lawsuit." Esser Electric v. Lost River 
Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 921, 188 P .3d 854, 863 (2008)( emphasis added). 
Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.e. § 12-120(3) unless the commercial transaction is 
integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." 
Brower, 117 Idaho at 784, 792 P.2d at 349. "To hold otherwise would be to convert the award of 
attorney's fees from an exceptional remedy justified only by statutory authority to a matter of 
right in virtually every lawsuit filed." Id. 
Here, the gravamen of the Garners' lawsuit is a dispute over the existence of and the 
4 The Poveys prevailed as to the claims the Garners brought specifically against the Poveys, but the Court should 
take into account the fact that the Garners obtained favorable results in their claims against the other defendants in 
the overall action. 
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Poveys' interference with the Garners' easement, not a commercial transaction. The so-called 
"transaction" by which Nola and Gary acquired their property was not the gravamen ofthe 
lawsuit; the transaction itself was not integral to the Garners' claims; and it was not the basis 
upon which the Garners attempted to recover. Instead, the basis upon which the Ga..111ers 
attempted to recover in this lawsuit was the Poveys' acts of interference with the Northern 
Roadway, ie: acts of physical interference and deeding servient estate property without 
identifying and excepting the Garner easement i~ those deeds.s The majority ofthe interfering 
acts the Garners alleged against the Poveys were many years removed from Nola's and Gary's 
purchase of property from the Poveys, and these acts of interference certainly did not arise out of 
a commercial transaction, or even a real estate transaction for that matter. 
The Idaho Supreme Court case of Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 
152 P.3d 594 (2007), illustrates what it means for a commercial transaction to be so integral to a 
claim that it must be considered the basis upon which the plaintiff seeks recovery. In Blimka, the 
plaintiff ordered and paid for 26,500 pairs of blue jeans from the defendant wholesaler. Upon 
receipt of the blue jeans, the plaintiff determined that the blue jeans did not conform to the 
representations of quality made by the defendant wholesaler, so the plaintiff rejected the goods. 
This rejection led to litigation between the parties, and the plaintiff claimed fraud, breach of 
implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of express warranty. Because these claims 
5 The Poveys misrepresent the arguments the Garners made in this case. In their brief, the Poveys state, "In their 
memorandum in opposition to these Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs again tied all their 
claims back to the commercial transaction between Gary and Nola Gamer and went on to argue that all the 
arguments made by them apply to their claims under the warranty deed." Mem. Costs and Fees at 3. In reality, the 
Garners only referenced Gary's and Nola's purchase of property from the Poveys to show how the Garners (Gary 
and Nola, but not Daniel) acquired their interest in the property and how the Poveys' obligation to protect the Gamer 
easement arose. The Garners did not "tie their claims" to any commercial transaction. Moreover, the Garners 
always maintained that Daniel's claims against the Poveys arose completely independently of Gary's and Nola's 
purchase of property from the Poveys .. Daniel's later acquisition of an interest in the property Nola and Gary 
purchased did not affect the independent basis he had for making a claim against the Poveys, and Daniel's 
independent basis was not grounded in any transaction with the Poveys of any nature. 
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arose directly out of the defendant's conduct within the context ofthe commercial transaction 
(ie: fraudulent representations about the quality ofthe blue jeans and the ultimate sale of 
nonconforming blue jeans to the plaintiff), the court found that a commercial transaction was 
integral to the lawsuit a..nd constituted the basis upon which the plaintiff sought recovery. 
Blimka, 143 Idaho at 729, 152 P.3d at 600. 
The instant case is distinguishable from Blimka. 6 Here, the wrongful conduct that gave 
rise to the Garners' claims against the Poveys did not occur within the context of a commercial 
transaction. Rather, most of it occurred much later. If, for example, the Garners had sued the 
Poveys for some material representation made by the Poveys during the process of negotiation 
for the 1992 sale ofthe property, then a commercial transaction7 could have been the gravamen 
or basis of the lawsuit. Such, however, is not the case. From the very outset, the gravamen of 
this lawsuit was, and still is, an easement dispute. In Brown v. Miller, 140 Idaho 439, 95 P.3d, 
57 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court declined to award attorney fees to the prevailing party under 
§ 12-120 in a case where the main issue was an easement. The court reasoned, "Because this 
case involves an easement, there is no basis for an award of fees under this statute.,,8 Brown, 140 
Idaho at 445, 95 P.3d at 64. Here, as in Brown, the central issue in this case is an easement, so 
an award of attorney fees under § 12-120 is not appropriate. 
II. The Poveys are not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121. 
The Court devoted thirty four pages to analyzing and discussing the issues raised by the 
6 See also Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912,188 P.3d 854 (2008). In Esser, 
the plaintiff claimed against the defendant for breach of contract and urijust enrichment. The defendant 
counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and fraud. All these claims arose directly out of the parties' contractual 
agreements wherein the defendant hired the plaintiff to provide material and perform lahor on a commercial 
rroperty. Like Blimka, Esser is distinguishable from the instant case. 
This hypothetical example assumes, arguendo, that the real estate transaction was a commercial transaction. As 
explained above, however, real estate transactions are generally not considered commercial transactions under § 12-
120(3). 
8 It is unclear from the opinion what the alleged commercial transaction was, but the implication of the court's 
decision is clear: easement cases are generally not the type of case in which § 12-120 attorney fees are awarded. 
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"", . .., 
parties' arguments regarding the Poveys' motion for summary judgment, the various motions 
related to the summary judgment motion, and the Garners' motion for leave to amend their 
complaint. The Court's decision clearly illustrates that it thoughtfully researched and considered 
the issues, many ofwbich were complex. Nevertheless, the Poveys assert that the Garners 
pursued their claims frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. Given all the 
circumstances ofthis litigation, the Garners did not pursue any claims in bad faith, frivolously, or 
without foundation. Thus, the Poveys are barred from recovering attorney fees under § 12-12l. 
The award of attorney fees under § 12-121 is within the Court's discretion. However, 
"[t]he award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 is not a matter of right, ... and a court 
should only award fees 'when it is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, 
defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. ,,, C & G v. Rule, 135 
Idaho 763, 769, 25 P.3d 76,82 (2001)(citing Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n, Inc. v. PUC, 
125 Idaho 401, 408,871 P.2d 818,825 (1994)). "[W]hen a party pursues an action which 
contains fairly debatable issues, the action is not considered to be frivolous and without 
foundation." C & G, 135 Idaho at 769, 25. P.3d at 82. "Legal arguments that are supported by a 
good faith argument for the extension or modification of the law in Idaho are not so plainly 
fallacious to be deemed frivolous." Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270, 277, 108 P.3d 417, 424 
(Idaho Ct. App. 2005)(citation omitted). "[A] claim is not necessarily frivolous or lacking in 
merit simply because it ultimately fails as a matter oflaw." GulfChem. Employees Fed. Credit 
Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 894, 693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984). "A 
misperception of the law, or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable. 
Rather, the question is whether the position adopted was not only incorrect, but so plainly 
fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation." Snipes v. 
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Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 P.2d 262,265 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997). 
The record in this action shows that the Garners pursued their claims in good faith and 
supported them with plausible and legitimate legal arguments. If the Garners' claims were so 
plainly fuvolous, the Court would have disposed of them in cO!l..nection with the Poveys' motion 
to dismiss.9 The Court, however, denied the Poveys' motion to dismiss and expressly found that 
the Garners had alleged facts and legal theories constituting colorable claims. (See Decision and 
Order on Povey Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at 11.) The fact that the 
Court did not ultimately agree with the Garners' analysis on the various claims does not render 
those claims frivolous. See GulfChem., 107 Idaho at 894, 693 P.2d at 1096. Moreover, the 
Garners presented issues for the Court's consideration that were at least debatable. This fact 
seems evident from 1) the Court's active participation and extensive questioning of both parties 
during the hearing on the Poveys' motion for summary judgment, and 2) the extent of analysis 
and myriad case citations involved in the Court's memorandum decision. 
An instructive case is C & G. In that case, the plaintiff, Galvin, sued the defendant 
railroad company, Union Pacific, and others, alleging that certain quitclaim deeds conveyed an 
easement interest and not a fee simple interest. In construing the deeds in question, the court 
detennined, contrary to Galvin's assertion, that the quitclaim deeds did, in fact, convey a fee 
simple interest. Union Pacific sought attorney fees under both § 12-120 and § 12-121. Although 
Union Pacific prevailed in the action, the court denied attorney fees under both statutes, and, 
with respect to § 12-121 explained, "Although the Court disagrees with Galvin's arguments 
regarding the construction of the deeds, we do not find that the action was brought frivolously, 
9 This assertion is especially true with respect to the Garners' claims for breach of warranty and interference with an 
easement by conveyance. The success of those claims was not dependent upon any further discovery. Rather, those 
claims were based on undisputed facts and recorded instruments, all of which were made part of the second 
amended complaint. 
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unreasonably, or without foundation. We thus decline to award fees to Union Pacific under I.e. 
§ 12-121." C & G, 135 Idaho at 769,25 P.3d at 82. The instant case is similar in this respect to 
C & G. While the Court ultimately disagreed with the Garners' analysis ofthe effect of various 
deeds in this case, there is no basis for claiming the action "was brought frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation." Id. 
For the first time in this litigation, the Poveys argue that the Garners brought this lawsuit 
for some illicit purpose, ie: "to avenge a perceived slight by Brad Povey against his niece, 
PlaintiffSherri-lo Garner, and her husband, Plaintiff Daniel Garner." Mem. Costs and Fees at 4. 
The only evidence supporting this egregious accusation is an affidavit of Jeffrey Neigum, a 
former defendant in this case. Mr. Neigum's affidavit contains false and irrelevant information, 
and it should not impact this Court's determination of whether to award attorney fees under § 12-
121, or any other statute or rule for that matter. 
The Garners brought this lawsuit because they were threatened with loss of year-round 
access to property upon which they rely for their economic livelihoods. Second Aff. Daniel 
Garner ~ 5. The purposes of this lawsuit were to ensure future access to the Garner property and 
to hold responsible those who played a role in diminishing or eliminating the Garners' access, 
not to "get even with the Poveys." Id. Mr. Neigum could not possibly know the motivation 
behind the Garners' lawsuit, for the conversation alleged to have taken place between Daniel 
Garner and Mr. Neigum in ~~ 4-5 of Mr. Neigum's affidavit never occurred. Second Aff. Daniel 
Garner~ 4. 
In view of the entire litigation, Mr. Neigum's affidavit notwithstanding, the Poveys have 
not met the very high standard for showing they are entitled to attorney fees under § 12-121. 
Although ultimately unsuccessful in their claims against the Poveys, the Garners brought these 
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claims in good faith with a reasonable basis in fact and law. The Court should deny the Poveys 
attorney fees under § 12-121. 
III. The Poveys attorney fees were not reasonably incurred. 
Even if the Court were to award attorney fees to the Poveys under either theory they have 
advanced, the Court should significantly reduce those fees to a reasonable amount. Rille 54 of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a discretionary award of reasonable attorney 
fees to the prevailing party. Idaho R. Civ. P 54(e)(1). The amount of$42,587.50 in attorney fees 
is excessive and unreasonable. The Poveys did not litigate claims brought by or against other 
parties in this lawsuit or counterclaims brought by themselves. They litigated only those issues 
brought by the Garners. While complex, the claims brought by the Garners did not reasonably 
require the amount offees generated by the Poveys' counsel. Moreover, the Poveys' approach to 
this litigation needlessly generated expense by both parties. The Poveys filed an ill-fated motion 
to dismiss that was not well supported by the facts of the case at the time. The Poveys pressed 
forward in deposing the Garners despite a request from counsel for the Deans, Neigums, and 
Viehwegs to postpone the depositions because settlement negotiations were underway. The 
depositions themselves were very lengthy, given the issues in the case. 
As it appeared settlement with the Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs, was imminent, the 
Garners offered to settle with the Poveys because,the Garners had accomplished the most 
important objective of the lawsuit: securing access to their property west of the Twin Lakes 
Canal. On September 17,2009, the Garners offered to dismiss the lawsuit against the Poveys, 
with each party to bear its own costs and fees. Affidavit of Jeffrey D. Brunson ~ 2. The Poveys 
refused this request and did not present a counteroffer. The Poveys' refusal to accept the offer to 
dismiss, or at least to discuss reasonable settlement terms, caused both parties to incur 
significantly greater costs and attorney fees in order to further brief and argue the summary 
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judgment issues. This circumstance shows that the Gamers sought to prevent the costs for both 
parties from escalating. The Poveys, on the other hand, unreasonably increased the cost of the 
litigation. 
The Poveys' claim for legal research is excessive. Mr. Atkin has not explained the basis 
for calculating these charges. Most law firms pay a flat rate for computerized research. Mr. 
Atkin does not make it clear how his firm pays for legal research in his affidavit, but assuming it 
pays a flat rate, these charges do not reflect what was actually paid for legal research. 
IV. Mr. Atkin's affidavit fails under Rule 54(e)(5). 
Rule 54(e)(5) requires that a claim for attomey fees as costs shall be supported by an 
affidavit of the attomey stating the basis and method of computation ofthe attomey fees claimed. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(5). The affidavit of Mr. Atkin fails to comply with this rule. While Mr. 
Atkin attempted to supply an affidavit, the affidavit does not appear to be signed (other than the 
mark "lsI" appearing in the signature field), and in any event, the affidavit is not properly 
notarized. The affidavit of the Poveys' attorney failing, the Court should disallow all attorney 
fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should disallow all attomey fees claimed by the 
Poveys as costs. Further, the Court should reduce any costs recoverable as a matter of right to a 
reasonable amount. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of November, 2009. 
Michael W. Brown 
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney, Attorneys 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
Motion to Disallow Costs - Page 13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I am a licensed attomey in the state of Idaho, I have my office in Rexburg, 
Idaho, and on November 23, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of Motion to Disallow Costs 
on the following individuals by the method of delivery designated: 
Blake S. Atkin 
837 South 500 West 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, UT 840 I 0 
Fax: (801) 533-0380 
Franklin County Courthouse 
39 W. Oneida 
Preston, ID 83263 
Fax: (208) 852-2926 
Judge Stephen S. Dunn 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center 
P.O. Box 4126 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Dated: November 23, 2009 
tJJ U.S. Mail tJJ Hand-delivered ~simile 
tJJ U.S. Mail ~d-delivered tJJ Facsimile 
[J U.S. Mail [J Hand-delivered ~Simi1e 
~f4:;{ ~~~-~ 
Michael W. Brown 
of Thatcher Beard S1. Clair Gaffney, Attorneys 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
Motion to Disallow Costs - Page 14 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
Michael W. Brown, ISB No. 8017 
343 E. 4th N. Suite 223 
P.O. Box 216 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Tel: (208) 359-5885 
Fax: (208) 359-5888 
jeff@beardstclair.com 
mbrown@beardstc1air.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
F 1 LEO 
09NOV23 PM 2:57 
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FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO 
Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Gamer, 
husband and wife; Nola Garner, a widow; 
and Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola 
Garner Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, 
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vs. 
Case No. CV-Q8-342 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY D. BRUNSON 
and wife; Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon 
C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and KathleenA. Neigum, as 
Trustees of the Jeffery J. Neigum and 
KathleenA. Neigum Revocable Trust, 
dated September 172004; Jeffery J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband 
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey, 
husband and wife; First American Title 
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title 
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of 
Authority; and First American Title 
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
ss. 
County of Madison 
I, JEFFREY D. BRUNSON, having first been sworn, depose and state: 
1. r am over the age of eighteen, am competent to testify, and do so from personal 
knowledge. 
2. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a letter, dated September 17,2009, I 
sent to counsel for the Poveys, Blake Atkin, Esq. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on November 2. '3,2009. 
~tf;i~ 
Notary Public for State ofIdaho 
Residing at {(E}(Bt.l~G-
My Commission Expires: S/It .. /"]...I>1f-
(SEAL) 
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Jeffrey D. Brunson 
Attorney 
343 E 41h North Ste. 223 • PO Box 216' Rexburg, ill 83440 
2105 Coronado Street· Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
September 17; 2009 
VIA FACSIMILE (801) 533-0380 
September 17, 2009 
Blake S. Atkin 
Atkin Law Offices, P.C. 
837 South, 500 West, Suite 200 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Phone (208) 359-5883 • Fax (208) 359-5888 
Email ~ 
Re: Franklin County Case No. CV-08-342, Rule 408 Offer to Compromise 
Dear Blake: 
Following your telephone conversation with Michael Brown late yesterday and your letter dated 
today, I believe it would be helpful to address a few issues before both parties make extensive 
efforts to prepare for the hearing you scheduled for October 6. It is my hope that the issues 
discussed in this letter will facilitate settlement. 
Attorney Fees 
If I understand your position correctly, your primary objective in continuing to litigate this case 
is to seek recovery of the Poveys' attorney fees incurred in tills action. You indicate in your 
letter that your clients will not agree to any settlement unless the Garners pay your clients' 
attorney fees in the amount of $34,900. 
Your demand strikes me as peculiar, considering how your client's attorney's fees were incurred. 
At the settlement conference, when your clients' attorney fees were presumably insubstantial, 
your clients indicated their willingness to pay the Garners to settle their claims. Since that time, 
other than the fees incurred in answering the Garners' second amended complaint, the bulk of the 
attorney fees incurred by your client came as a result of the following actions initiated by you: 1) 
filing an unsuccessful motion to dismiss (which you subsequently acknowledged to me had little 
chance of being granted), 2) insisting on conducting two full days of depositions (even though 
counsel for Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs asked you to postpone the depositions because a 
settlement agreement, which would impact the course of the litigation as to your clients, 
appeared likely), and 3) filing a motion for summary judgment. While it is clearly your 
prerogative to take these actions, it would be unfair to accuse the Garners of causing your 
clients' large legal bill at this stage of the litigation. 
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Assuming for argument's sake only that you were able to prevail in this case, I believe your 
confidence in your ability to recover attorney fees in this ca~e is misplaced. The primary issue in 
this case is the existence of and interference with the Garners' easement. These issues are not 
grounded in a commercial transaction between our clients. Even the Garners' breach of warranty 
claim is based on your clients' interference with the Gamer easement. Thus, an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12~ 120 appears highly unlikely. 
Consider the following case addressing the award of attorney fees: In Brown v. Miller, 140 Idaho 
439, 95 P.3d 57 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the district court's denial of attorney 
fees claimed by the party that prevailed at the district court level. In determining whether Idaho 
Code § 12-120 applied to the case, the court reasoned, "Because this case involves an easement, 
there is no basis for an award of fees under this statute." Brown, 140 Idaho at 445,95 P.3d at 63. 
The central issue in this case is an easement, which provides no § 12:-120 basis for attorney fees. 
The gravamen ofthis case deals with easement and interference with easement and is not a 
commercial transaction. 
The only other basis for recovery of attorney fees would be under Idaho Code § 12-121. Inorder 
to prevail under that statute, the court would need to find, "from the facts presented to it, that the 
case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." 
Brown, 140 Idaho at 445,95 P.3d at 63. Such a finding by the court again is unlikely, especially 
given the fact that the court denied your clients' motion to dismiss. In its order, the court 
indicated that the Garners made colorable claims of interference and breach of warranty. 
Assigned Claims 
Turning to more substantive issues in the litigation, it seems you underestimate the strength of 
the claims the Garners will have received by assignment from the Deans, Neigums, and 
Viehwegs. As you know, the Garners intend to move the court for leave to amend their 
complaint by adding the claims assigned by Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs. This motion will 
likely be granted because a trial date has not even been set and the Garners will have only very 
recently received the assigned claims. 
The Garners are still evaluating potential claims the Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs could have 
brought against the Poveys. Nevertheless, it seems clear that one or more of those parties could 
have brought claims for breach of warranty and fraud against the Poveys. These claims arise 
from the fact that the Poveys had knowledge of the existence of the Garners' interest in the 
northern roadway, but conveyed the underlying servient estate properties without indicating or 
acknowledging these properties were subject to the Garners' northern roadway easement. I 
know you have repeatedly claimed the Poveys have done nothing but enhance the Garners' 
easement. The facts, however, indicate otherwise. In anticipation of the sale of his property to 
the Neigums, Mr. Povey approached Daniel Garner and sought to persuade him to relinquish the 
northern roadway easement and accept the middle roadway instead. This fact indicates Mr. 
Povey 1) acknowledged Daniel's easement over the northern roadway and 2) understood that the 
prospective buyers would be less inclined to buy what is now the Viehweg property with its 
being subject to Daniel's easement over the northern roadway. Daniel rejected this proposal, but 
Mr. Povey went ahead and conveyed the parcel to the Neigums and represented that Daniel's 
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easement covered the middle roadway (twenty feet in width), not the northern roadway (thirty 
feet in width) in which Mr. Povey knew Daniel had an interest. Mr. Povey subsequently 
conveyed a parcel to Viehwegs. As you know the deed from the Poveys to the Viehwegs 
contains no reference whatsoever to any Garner easement even though the Poveys knew of both 
the Garners' claim to the northern roadway and the easement identified in the Neigum deed. 
These actions are the underlying cause of this entire lawsuit, and the Garners will soon own all 
causes of actions stelThl1ing therefrom. 
Povey's fraudulent conduct also gives rise to a punitive damages claim. The case law discussing 
the tort of fraud's relationship with punitive damages suggests that proof of fraud satisfies both 
the "bad act" requirement and the ''bad state of mind" requirement for punitive damages. See 
Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 710, 682 P.2d 1247, 1257 (1983). "It is well established in 
this state that punitive damages may be awarded when the defendant has committed fraud." ld.; 
see also Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 496 P.2d 939 (1972). In Umphrey the Court found 
that the defendant's "practice of falsely representing that building lots would be supplied with 
adequate water and access falls squarely within the ambit of deceptive business practices in 
which the award of additional punitive damages is authorized." ld. at 711,682 P.2d at 1258. 
The facts here establish the Poveys committed fraud by knowingly inducing the Viehwegs to 
purchase property subject to the Garner easement while falsely representing that the property 
was free from any encumbrances. These same facts also give rise to a punitive damages claim. 
The foregoing facts establish claims on which the Garners, as assignees of those claims, will 
likely prevail if they are tried before a jury. In any event, the Garners will allege in their third 
amended complaint triable issues of fact that will preclude a motion to dismiss and summary 
judgment.! 
Conflict of Interest 
When I was discussing this case with my client last night he mentioned that you had represented 
him. This is consistent with what you told me early on in this case when you stated you were 
going to have to fmd other counsel for the Poveys because you had a conflict of interest. Do you 
have a conflict of interest? I would like to avoid filing a motion to disqualify you if you in fact 
do not have a conflict. 
Response to Offer and Counteroffer 
I have conveyed to the Garners your clients' offer to settle upon payment of $34,900 in attorney 
fees as requested by your clients. The Garners decline that offer. However, after considering the 
likely expense of protracted litigation, including necessary discovery the Garners would conduct 
following the amendment of their complaint, the Garners have authorized me to extend another 
offer to your clients. The Garners offer your clients a walk away, meaning both parties would 
release each other from all claims and counterclaims, stipulate to ~e dismissal with prejUdice of 
the lawsuit, and bear their own attorney fees and costs incurred in this action. Please convey this 
I Even if the judge doesn't allow the amendment, there are triable issues offact on the Garners' claims against the 
Poveys. 
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offer to your clients. In counseling with your clients, I urge you to consider the issues raised in 
this letter. This offer is a good faith attempt on the part of the Garners to bring peaceful 
resolution to this matter and to avoid significant expenses to be incurred by both sides if the 
litigation continues. This is a one-time offer and will not be renewed. This offer will remain 
open unti15:00 p.m. on September 18, 2009. 
If you have any doubt about the veracity and merit of the Garners' current claims or the claims 
that are to be assigned please do not hesitate to contact me to discuss. 
Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903 
7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, Idaho 83228 
Telephone: (208) 747-3414 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.e. 
837 South 500 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380 
Attorney for the Povey Defendants 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner, husband 
and wife; Nola Garner, a widow and Nola 
Garner as Trustee of the Nola Garner Living 
Trust, dated July 19, 2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Hal J Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband and 
wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon e. 
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey 1. Neigum 
and Kathleen A Neigum, as Trustees of the 
Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A Neigum 
Revocable Trust, dated September 17, 2004; 
Jeffery 1. Neigum and Kathleen A Neigum, 
husband and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey, 
husband and wife; First American Title 
Insurance Company, a Foreign Tide Insurer 
with an Idaho Certificate of Authority; and First 
American Title Company, Inc., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES 
Case No. CV -08-342 
Judge Dunn 
,(" 
Defendants Brad and Leiza Povey ("Poveys"), by and through undersigned counsel, hereby 
submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of Memorandum of Costs Including Attorney Fees. 
INTRODUCTION 
As if to underscore the need for an award of attorney fees in this case, Plaintiffs' opposition to 
the Povey Defendants' Memorandum of Costs Including Attorney Fees misstates the course of the 
litigation, exaggerates the facts and overstates the law they try to set forth. When the facts of this 
case are analyzed in light of the claims made against the Poveys and the law as it relates to the 
recovery of attorney fees by a prevailing party, there can be no doubt that an award of attorney fees is 
necessary to remedy the wrong that was perpetrated by the Plaintiffs bringing the Poveys into this 
litigation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING REAL ESTATE ARE NOT PRECLUDED 
FROM APPLICATION OF IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3) 
Plaintiffs take the position that Idaho Code § 12-120(3) cannot apply to this case because this 
IS a case involving real estate. Plaintiffs reach that position by reference to an antiquated 
interpretation of Idaho Code § 12-120(3) that has been expressly overruled. 
Plaintiffs quote from Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. Idaho, 978 P. 2d 233,237 (Id. 1999): 
"the term commercial transaction is not generally applied to real estate transactions, or to issues 
involving the ownership of property." Plaintiffs fail to point out that this quote is taken from the case 
of Bastian v. Albertson's Inc., 643 P.2d 1079 (Id. Ct. App. 1982) and that case was expressly 
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overruled on that point in Herrick v. Leuzinger, 900 P. 2d 201,214 (Id. Ct. App. 1995). 
A transaction involving real estate can be a "commercial transaction" for purposes of § 12-
120(3). See, Lexington Heights Development v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 92 P.3d 526 
(2004)(sale of real estate is a commercial transaction); Troupis v. Summer, P.3d _, 2009 WL 
3232677 (Id. 2009)(action by cotenant for partition of real estate is a commercial transaction under 
section 12-120(3». The assertion that § 12-120(3) cannot apply when real estate is involved in an 
otherwise commercial transaction is much too broad. There is a group of real estate cases that are 
excepted from application of § 12-120(3), but our Supreme Court has limited that exception to those 
cases where the gravamen of the case is ownership of real estate. 
The case Plaintiffs cite in footnote 1 oftheir Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees clarifies this 
principle. The discussion in C&G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 25 P.3d 82 (2001), makes it clear that 
it is not the existence of a real estate issue in the case that takes it outside the realm of § 12-120(3), 
but rather the fact that the case involves determination of property rights.l The Court's citation to 
precedent and its description of each case on which it relies shows that its holding would not apply to 
Plaintiffs' claims against the Poveys since Poveys never disputed the Garner' property rights, and 
Plaintiffs' claims against Poveys could not result in a determination of any property rights. 
1 The Treasure Vallev Concrete case is one of those "detennination of property right'>" cases. The issue in that case was an 
interpretation of a mineral reservation under a state statute. Likewise, Brown v.Miller, 140 Idaho 439,96 P.3d 57 (2004) is 
completely inapplicable. Not only did the case focus on o\mersrup of the easement in question, but there the Court was 
dealing with the application of § 12-120( 1) ",ith a jurisdictional limit of $25,000. Here, the Garners sought $500,000 in 
damages from the Poveys, and, as alleged by the Plaintiffs, the Poveys' claim arises under section (3) of § 12-120. 
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The present situation is instead more analogous to situations involving the 
determination of property rights where this Court and the Court of Appeals have 
uniformly denied an award of attorney fees. See, Jerry 1. Joseph CL.UIns. Assoc. v. 
Vauo:ht.117 Idaho 555, 789 P.2d 1146 (Ct.App.1990) (denying attorney fees 
under I.C § 12-120(3) in an action where property owner sought a judgment 
compelling adjoining property owners to reimburse it for irrigation assessments, to 
record an instrument establishing an access easement, and to remove a fence hindering 
its use of the easement and where after settlement, adjoining property owners 
breached the settlement agreement); Chen v. Conwav. 121 Idaho 1006, 829 P.2d 
~ ~ 
1355 (Ct.App.1991) (determining that a quiet title action involving dispute over the 
existence of a prescriptive easement was not a commercial transaction under 1. C. § 
12-120(3)); Durrant v. Christensen. J 17 Idaho 70, 785 P.2d 634 (1990) (holding that 
an action in which landowners sought adjudication of water rights and a permanent 
restraining order prohibiting the defendant from interfering with their diversion and 
use of water determined was not based on a commercial transaction as defined in I.e. 
§ 12-120(3»; Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657,962 P.2d 
1041 (1998) (stating that an action to detefl1line ownership and easement lights did 
not fall within the meaning of a commercial transaction under I.C 12-120(3) and 
therefore attorney fees were properly denied). Accordingly, we decline to award fees 
to Union Pacific under I.C § 12-120(3). 
C&Gat 82. 
If one of the property owner Defendants in this case were trying to recover attorney fees from 
Plaintiffs, C&G and the cases it cites might be relevant. However, the Poveys simply had no dog in 
the fight between the Garners and the other Defendants. As it relates to the Poveys, this case is not a 
case that could "determine property rights." The Poveys own no property in the vicinity, and the 
Poveys have never disputed the Garners right of way claim. 2 As between the Poveys and the 
Garners, it is the "determination of property rights" issue that is tangential to the litigation. The 
exclusion of the Poveys from the settlement discussions that determined the property rights in this 
4 
case shows that the litigation brought against the Poveys is not one of those "situations involving the 
determination of property rights where [the Courts] have denied an award of attorney fees." 
Where a party alleges the existence of a contract that would be a commercial transaction 
under the statute, "that claim triggers the application of the statute, and the prevailing party may 
recover attorney fees even if no liability under the contract is established." Lexington Heights 
Development, LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 92 P.3d 526, (2004)(alleged sale ofreal estate 
triggered application of section 12-120(3)). Here, Plaintiffs triggered application of § 12-120(3) by 
stating that it was the commercial transaction ofpuf(~hasing the :eal estate that lay at the heart of their 
claims. "The purchase ofthe real estate by Gary and Nola from Povey Defendants was a commercial 
transaction under Idaho Code Sec. 12-120(3) so Plaintiffs, as successors to Gary and Nola, should be 
entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees from Defendants Brad Povey and 
Leaza Povey." See, Second Amended Complaint, ~ 37.3 
ll. THE ALLEGED BREACH OF WARRANTY ARISING FROM GARY AND 
NOLA'S PURCHASE OF THE PROPERTY FROM POVEYS WAS THE 
GRA VAMAN OF PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT. 
2 "In answering paragraph 32 of the second amended complaint, the Povey defendants admit that they were on notice of 
the existence of the established road and that it ,",vas used by the plaintiffs." See, Ails·wer to Second Amended Complaint, 
in Court File. . 
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Plaintiffs argue that the Poveys' denial of the compound allegations in paragraph 37 somehow negates the application of § 
12-120(3) to this case. That assertion is wrong both factually and legally. Factually it is wrong because when fairly read, the 
Poveys were denying that the Gamel's had a need to employ attorneys and seek damages as a result of any action by the 
Poveys. Legally it is wrong because the Idaho cases are myriad that point out that the invocation by the plaintiff of a 
commercial transaction claim triggers the right to recover attorney fees, even if it later is shown that the claim was without 
merit or even that the commercial transaction never existed. Miller v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., 139 
Idaho 825, 87 P.3d 934 (2004)(If a party asserts a claim that is based upon the existence of an alleged commercial 
transaction, attorney fees are awardable to a prevailing party who defends against such claim even lithe alleged commercial 
transaction is found not to have existed). 
5 
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A careful reading of C&G and its treatment of precedent suggests that there is not, in fact, an 
exception in § 12-120(3) for transactions involving real estate, but only a specific application of the 
general test, i.e., whether the real estate transaction was the gravamen of the action and the basis on 
which Plaintiffs sought to recover. The Court found that, in those cases it cited, § 12-120(3) did not 
apply because the commercial transaction was not "integral to the claim, and [did not] constitute the 
basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." Citing, Browerv. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & 
Co., 117 Idaho 780,784,792 P.2d 345,349 (1990). 
The real issue under § 12-120(3) is whether Gary and Nola's purchase of property from the 
Poveys, and the warranty they claimed that purchase entailed, was the gravamen of the action brought 
by the Plaintiffs. Johannsen v. Utterbeck, Id. 2008, 2008 WL 4595248 (The critical test in 
determining application of § 12-120(3) is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen 
of the lawsuit; it must be integral to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the party is 
attempting to recover). Breach of warranty claims are covered by § 12-120(3). Walker v. American 
Cyanamid Co., 130 Idaho 824, 948 P.2d 1123 (1997). And, when they commenced this action 
against the Poveys, the Garners claimed that their breach of warranty claim was the basis for their 
recovery: "The purchase of the real estate by Gary and Nola from Povey Defendants was a 
commercial transaction under Idaho Code Sec. 12-120(3) so Plaintiffs, as successors to Gary and 
Nola, should be entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees from Defendants Brad Povey and 
Leiza Povey." See, Second Amended Complaint, ,-r 37. 
In their opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the Garners argued that the sale to 
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Gary and Nola and the alleged "breach of warranty" in connection with that sale was at the heart of 
their claims. On page 18 of the Memorandum in Opposition to Poveys' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Garners argued: 
The Garners' breach of warranty claim arises from many of the same facts and 
circumstances described above in II.A. [alleged efforts by Poveys to eliminate the 
Garners' easement and so-called wrongful conveyance to third parties]. It also arises 
from the fact that the Poveys failed to warrant and defend title to the parcel, with its 
appurtenant original access road easement, Nola and Gary bought from the Poveys in 
1992 .... the Garners' breach of warranty claim is supported within the allegations of 
the Amended Complaint because it may arise out of the ... deeds given by the Poveys 
to the Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs. 
Even now, the Garners continue to acknowledge, as they must because the Poveys no longer 
own the ground the Garners were seeking, that the transactions by which the Poveys sold property to 
the other Defendants is the gravamen of the Complaint against the Poveys. 
The Garners concluded that certain acts and omissions by the Poveys, including the 
manner in which the Poveys transferred the servient estate to the Deans, N eigums, 
and Viehwegs, were at the heart ofthe plight in which the Garners found themselves. 
Thus, the Garners named the Poveys as defendants in the lawsuit. 
Motion to Disallow Costs at p. 2. 
And of course, those transactions only have relevance because of the claim of warranty the 
Garners allege arose out of the commercial transaction by which the Poveys sold real estate to the 
Garners. "The Garners' breach of warranty claim is supported within the allegations of the Amended 
Complaint because it may arise out of the ... deeds given by the Poveys to the Deans, Neigums, and 
Viehwegs." Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment at pg. 18. While the Garners now 
are trying to distance themselves from the commercial transaction by which the Poveys sold Nola and 
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Gary their property, 4 that transaction has always been integral to the claims made by the Garners 
throughout the litigation. The Garners were careful in their Complaint to point out that all the 
Garners, including Dan Gamer, were now owners of the property that the Poveys sold to Gary and 
Nola and entitled to the rights conveyed in that transaction. Second Amended Complaint at ,-rlS. 
Then, in invoking § 12-120(3), the Garners alleged "Plaintiffs, as successors to Gary and Nola, should 
be entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees from Defendants Brad Povey and Leiza Povey." 
Second Amended Complaint at ~37. 
The Garners point out that Dan Gamer had claims that arose separate and apart from the 
claims asserted by him through succession to the breach of warranty claims of Gary and Nola. While 
this makes for an interesting theoretical question, it makes no difference in this case. When one 
considers that the way the Garners embroiled the Poveys in this controversy is by specific reference to 
the supposed breach of warranty arising from the Povey sale from which all the Garners eventually 
became owners of property, it becomes obvious that that transaction was at the heart of their claim 
and the basis on which they were seeking recovery from the Poveys. 
As they pointed out in their opposition to summary judgment, "The Garners' breach of 
warranty claim arises from many of the same facts and circumstances described above in II.A. [alleged 
efforts by Poveys to eliminate the Garners' easement and so-called wrongful conveyance to third 
parties]. So even if Daniel had not tried to coat-tail on his parents' breach of warranty claims, it 
4 For instance. the Garners make the ridiculous attempt to relegate their breach of warranty claims to "nothing more than an 
attempt by the Garners to exhaust every conceivable and alternative basis for recovery at the complaint stage." Motion to 
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would have had no substantial impact on the amount of attorney fees the Poveys incurred. There 
simply is, at this late date, no room for argument that the gravamen of the claim against the Poveys 
was other than the warranty Plaintiffs claim arose out of the sale to Gary and Nola. 
ill. THE POVEYS RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD NOT BE 
REDUCED. 
The Garners put forth various reasons why the recovery by the Poveys should be less than the 
full amount of attorney fees that the Poveys incurred. None of the arguments has any substance. 
The Garners take the position that the award of attorney fees to the Poveys should be reduced 
because the Garners obtained some of what they were seeking from the other Defendants. In this 
regard, the Garners are making the Poveys' argument for them. The Poveys have never taken the 
position that the Garners were not entitled to an access, and never denied that the Garners had an 
easement across the Northern Road. The Poveys, in fact, are the only ones who ever recorded on any 
deed the Garners' right to access and expressly set out in the Niegum deed the route of the easement 
that has now been settled upon by the other parties. The Poveys applaud the Garners on their success 
with the other Defendants. In making this argument, the Garners have forgotten that counsel for the 
Poveys proposed a stand down between the Garners and the Poveys for just that purpose-so that the 
parties who had no insurance for these claims would not incur unnecessary attorney fees. The Poveys 
simply were always at a complete loss to understand why the Garners embroiled them in this 
litigation, and then revoked the stand down agreement, until Jeffrey Niegum shed his light on that 
Disallow Costs at pg. 5. The Court is well aware that is not how the case ,vas tried. 
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question. 
The Garners' arguments about the Poveys incurring unnecessary costs by' refusing 
unreasonable settlement offers after the summary judgment motion was filed is at least a gross 
distortion of reality. The Poveys offered settlement several times during the course of the litigation. 
Early on in the case, when the attorney fees were less than $3,000, the Poveys offered to settle and 
eat the attorney fees they had incurred. No response from the Garners. Before filing the deposition 
notices, the Poveys pointed out the upcoming large expenditure of fees and offered to settle. No 
response from the Garners. Not once did the Garners propose settlement until after the summary 
judgment motion was filed. Even at that point Poveys offered to settle, but only if the Garners were 
willing to reimburse some of the fees. See, Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin dated September 29,2009, in 
Court File. It was only then that the Garners sent the threatening letter attached to the Brunson 
affidavit which they have the audacity to call a settlement proposal. Too little, too late. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD FEES UNDER IDAHO CODE SECTION 12-
121. 
The award of attorney fees pursuant to L C. § 12-121 is not a matter of right, and a court 
should only award fees "when it is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, 
or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n, 
Inc. v. PUC, 125 Idaho 401,408, 871 P.2d 818,825 (1994). In this case, the Affidavit of Jeffrey 
Niegum in which he revealed Daniel Gamer's and Sherri-Jo Gamer's ulterior motive for embroiling 
the Poveys in this lawsuit when coupled with the otherwise inexplicable events that occurred in this 
10 
case, provides the basis for just such an abiding belief. 5 
When speaking of inexplicable events, one must start with the filing of the Complaint against 
the Poveys. It simply is counterintuitive to sue a former owner of property when the current owner 
and his title insurer challenges your right of access. Particularly, without first asking the Poveys what 
their position is on the right of access. 
Related to the first inexplicable event is the Garners' decision not to include as defendants all 
of the grantors on the deed. Brad and Leiza Poveys' co-grantors on the deed, Hank and Melanie 
Povey were not named as defendants in the case. The stated reason for not suing Hank and Melanie 
while suing Brad and Leiza is that: 
Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Henry Nels Povey and Melanie Povey, 
husband and wife, ... will acknowledge the four Poveys had acquired the property 
subject to the right-of-way of Daniel while the Poveys had the right to use the right of 
way to access their property west of Twin Lakes Canal. Henry and Melanie Povey 
should acknowledge Daniel, his wife, Nola and the Nola trust have had the right to 
use of the right of way to access their property west of twin lakes canal. ... Because 
of the expected cooperation of Henry and Melanie for Daniel and his wife and Nola 
and the Nola Trust to preserve their access rights Daniel and his wife and Nola and 
the Nola trust do not claim damages against them. 
Second Amended Complaint at ~34. 
5 Plaintiffs have submitted the Second Affidavit of Daniel Garn~r, apparently in response to the Jeffrey Niegum Affidavit. 
That affidavit is as telling in what it does not say as for what it does say. It does not deny that he and his wife had an axe to 
grind with Brad Povey over the sale of the Troy Grave's Dairy, but rather employs an evasive technique-trying to explain 
physically why Daniel Garner would not want to become a dairy farmer. Interestingly, even though Je:ffi:ey Niegum describes 




This is the attitude that one would expect from a litigant in the Garners' situation. But not 
just with respect to two of their grantors in title, but to all four. This discriminatory treatment of 
Brad and Leiza Pavey is even more inexplicable when it became clear that Brad and Leiza took the 
same position with regard to the right of way as is ascribed to Hank and Melanie. In their Motion to 
Dismiss the Amended Complaint, the Pavey Defendants stated: 
The court should note that the very same circumstances that led the Plaintiffs to not 
include Henry and Melanie Pavey in the amended complaint would appear to apply 
with equal force to the Pavey Defendants. The Amended Complaint does not allege 
that Brad and Leiza Pavey will not acknowledge the four Poveys had acquired the 
property subject to the right-of-way of Daniel while the Poveys had the right to use 
the right-of-way to access their property west of Twin Lakes Canal. Nor does the 
Amended Complaint allege that Brad and Leiza Pavey would fail to acknowledge 
Daniel, his wife, Gary and Nola, and the Nola Trust have had the right to use of the 
right-of-way to access their property west of the Twin Lakes Canal. There is no 
reason to believe that Brad Pavey will be any less solicitous of the Garners' interests 
than his brother. Indeed, as pointed out in the motion to dismiss, Brad Pavey is the 
only person who put any provision in any deed to memorialize the access rights ofthe 
Garners. 
Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss at note 1. 
Only the retaliation motive set out in the Niegum Aftldavit explains the otherwise bizarre 
behavior of suing only two of the four grantors. 
Next on the list of inexplicable events was the demand in January 2009, that the Poveys 
respond to the Complaint after the Poveys' lawyer had negotiated a stand down agreement to prevent 
the running of attorney fees by the only parties who were not covered by insurance, while the Garners 
litigated with the insured Defendants. See, Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin in Opposition to Motion for 
Enlargement of Time dated September 29,2009, at ~6 in Court File. At the time the demand made 
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little sense. Certainly, it does not fit well with the current position of the Garners that the litigation 
and fees incurred by the Poveys was unnecessary given the ongoing, albeit secret, settlement 
negotiations with the other Defendants. Given the information revealed by JeffNiegum, the reason 
the Poveys were required to respond to the Complaint in January was so that the Garners could be 
exacting their pound of flesh while negotiating with the other Defendants. 
The next inexplicable event or series of events was the Garners' refusal to include the Poveys 
in the settlement negotiations which were going on unbeknownst to the Poveys. The Poveys made 
several settlement overtures to the Garners, but received no settlement offers in return until after they 
filed their summary judgment motion. See, Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin in Opposition to Motion for 
Enlargement of Time dated September 29, 2009, in Court File. 
The conduct of the Garners toward the Poveys in this litigation is inexplicable until one 
considers the facts revealed in the Jeffrey Niegum Affidavit.. If this litigation was brought and 
maintained against the Poveys to satisfY Dan and Sherri-Jo's need for revenge, then their conduct of 
the litigation makes perfect sense-it's just that use oflitigation for that purpose is inappropriate. 
A more appropriate case for an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 for an 
action that was pursued, defended, or brought fiivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation can 
hardly be imagined. 
In this regard, it would be well to note that fees are appropriate not only in the case where the 
complaint is filed frivolously, but also where the action has continued to be pursued unreasonably or 
without foundation. As pointed out above, the Poveys never took a position that the Garners were 
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not entitled to the right of way that they asserted. Yet, the Garners continued to demand that the 
Poveys defend the Garners' $500,000 claim long after it became clear that the claim had no merit. In 
fact, the Garners continue to assert blame and wrongdoing on the part of the Poveys even though this 
Court has ruled that no wrongdoing occurred. Some examples of that stubborn litigiousness are: 
Here the wrongful conduct that gave rise to the Garners' claims against the Poveys did not 
occur within the context of a commercial transaction. Rather, most of it occurred much 
later. 
Motion to Disallow Costs at p. 8. 
I named the Poveys as defendants in this lawsuit because their actions led to my access 
being in jeopardy. 
Second Affidavit of Daniel Garner at ~ 5. 
This stubborn unwillingness to acknowledge their error in embroiling the Poveys in this 
lawsuit solidifies the abiding belief that the action was pursued, det'€mded, or brought trivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. Even in jurisdictions where the American rule generally 
applies, situations like this case often result in an award of attorney fees. "There are numerous 
exceptions to the general attorney fees rule because' a court has inherent equitable power to award 
reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the interest of justice and equity.' Stewart v. 
Utah Pub. Servo Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759,782 (Utah 1994). Exceptions include: 'when a party acts 'itl 
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, ,,, id (citation omitted). Here, there is 
ample justification for the Court to exercise its discretion to award fees. 
V. THE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE S. ATKIN WAS PROPERLY SIGNED AND 
NOTARIZED. 
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Counsel for the Poveys apologizes that the copy of the Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin mailed to 
opposing counsel was not a signed and notarized copy. A signed and notarized copy was filed with 
the Court, and can be provided to opposing counsel upon request. The Affidavit with its attachment 
provides the Court with the time spent on each task of the litigation with the hourly rate charged for 
each item. As such it appears to comply with the requirements of the Rule. Ifthe Court deems more 
detail is necessary, Counsel would be happy to attempt a more thorough expose of the attorney fees 
incurred in this case. Attached hereto as Exhibit A, is a Supplemental Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin in 
Support of Memorandum of Costs Including Attorney Fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Court should grant the Povey Defendants an award of all 
the fees and costs they have incurred in this case. 
DATED THISZ fday of December, 2009. 
ATKIN LAW OFFICS, P.C 
Blake S. Atkin 
Attorneyfor the Povey Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this _ day of December, 2009, he caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES upon the following by the 
method of delivery designated: 
Gordon S. Thatcher 
Michael Brown 
Thatcher, Beard, St. Clair, Gaffney 
116 S. Center 
P.O. Box 216 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Franklin County Court 
39 West Oneida 
Preston, Idaho 83263 
Judge Stephen S. Dunn 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
!L US. Mail _. Hand Delivery Fax 
!L U.S. Mail _Hand Delivery Fax 
!L US. Mail _Hand Delivery Fax 
Blake S. Atkin 
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Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903 
7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, Idaho 83228 
Telephone: (208) 747-3414 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.c. 
837 South 500 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380 
Attorneys for the Povey Defendants 
F I LED 
09 DEC 28 PH I: 25 
T'f CLE~K 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Gamer, 
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow and 
Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Garner 
Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Hal 1. Dean and Marlene 1. Dean, husband 
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. 
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey 1. 
Neigum and Kathleen A Neigum, as Trustees 
of the Jeffery 1. Neigum and Kathleen A 
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September 
17, 2004; Jeffery 1. Neigum and Kathleen A 
Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and 
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First 
American Title Insurance Company, a 
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho 
Certificate of Authority; and First American 
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDA VIT OF BLAKE S. ATKIN 
Case No. CV-08-342 
Judge Dunn 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN) 
:ss 
Blake S. Atkin, having been first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. Attached hereto are two letters dated September 16, 2009 and September 21, 2009 
that I sent on or about those dates to counsel for the Garners. 
Blake S. Atkin 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this H day of December, 2009. 
Jtt ~L ey of//?~tJ 
Notary Public. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _ day of December, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE S. ATKIN upon the following by the method of 
delivery designated: 
Gordon S. Thatcher 
Michael Brown 
Thatcher, Beard, st. Clair, Gaffney 
116 S. Center 
P.O. Box 216 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Franklin County Court 
39 West Oneida 
Preston, Idaho 83263 
Judge Stephen S. Dunn 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
L U.S. Mail _Hand Delivery Fax 
L U.S. Mail _Hand Delivery Fax 
L U.S. Mail _Hand Delivery Fax 
Blake S. Atkin 
Michael W. Brown 
343 E. 4th North 
P.O. Box 216 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Via fax: (208) 359-5888 
Dear Michael: 
ATKIN LA W OFFICES 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
837 South 500 West Suite 200 
BOUNTIFUL. UTAH 84010 
TELEPHONE (801) 533-0300 
FACSIMJLE (80 J) 533-0380 
e-mail: batkin@atkinlawoftlces.net 
September 16, 2009 
As we discussed on the phone yesterday, I have repeatedly explained to you and your 
clients my view that their action against the Poveys was from the beginning absolutely indefensible. 
I invited you to dismiss the case early on without repercussions, but my pleas were ignored. At 
one point I even suggested dismissal of my clients by a certain date and that if it did not happen by 
that date your clients would have to first make my clients whole before the case could be 
dismissed. Again my warnings were ignored. 
Obviously, your suggestion, at this late date and after substantial attorney fees have been 
incurred, that my clients pay you money will not be considered. That is not to say that the Poveys 
are opposed to settlement. It is heart breaking for them to be embroiled in this litigation with close 
neighbors, friends and family, but at this point and given our repeated pleas for reason, they are not 
in a position to settle without being made whole. In that regard, the Poveys have incurred fees to 
date of $34, 900. Upon payment of that amount the Poveys will agree to a full and complete 
settlement with the Garners who I now understand from your correspondence own all the claims 
that might have been brought by any of the parties. 
This offer will remain open until September 20,2009. 
Sincerely, 
/C; I 
Blake S. Atkin 
BSAra 
Cc: Brad Povey 
ATKIN LA W OFFICES 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
343 East 4th North Ste. 223 
P.O. Box 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
837 SOUTH 500 WEST. SUITE 200 
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 84010 
TELEPHONE (801) 533-0300 
FACSIMILE (801) 533-0380 
e-mail: batkin@atkinlawoffices.net 
September 21, 2009 
VIA FAX: (208) 359-5888 
Dear Jeff: 
I read your letter dated September 17,2009 this morning. I note that the settlement offer 
you made in that letter expired on September 18, 2009, but there are a number of statements that 
you make in that letter that I cannot leave unanswered. 
First of all, I do not have a conflict of interest. I have never represented Danny Gamer. 
The reluctance I initially felt about getting involved in this litigation is due to the deep friendship I 
feel toward your clients. Nola Garner is one of my very favorite people. I am close friends with 
Danny's brother, Lynn, and I consider Danny a friend and had hoped to keep it that way. In fact, 
my final decision to represent the Poveys was in no small part fueled by my hope that I could 
bring some light to the conflict and convince these parties to settle before the money was spent. 
In that regard I must say that I take personal offense at your accusation that the fees incurred to 
date are my fault. I specifically told you early on when the fees were only a few thousand dollars 
that my clients would walk away at that point, but later that would no longer be an option. You 
chose to ignore my warning. After the depositions were noticed you could have tried to settle at 
that point. You made no attempt. Now, having seen the light and hopefully recognizing that the 
fight between the Garners and the Poveys makes no sense whatever, instead of making a 
conciliatory offer you instead threaten to widen the litigation by asserting claims that the other 
parties chose not to assert. This appears to me to be more of the foolishness that has brought us 
to the point that the amount of fees incurred makes this case impossible to settle. I do believe that 
the claims pursued to this point were brought, and at least pursued after it became obvious that 
they were being pursued unreasonably and without foundation. Similarly, I suspect that the other 
parties chose not to pursue the assigned claims precisely because they did not want to have to pay 
the Povey's fees for having pursued such outrageous claims. 
Sincerely, 
(>/ 
Blake S. Atkin 
Cc: Brad and Lieza Povey 
Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903 
7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, Idaho 83228 
Telephone: (208) 747-3414 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
837 South 500 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380 
Attorneys for the Povey Defendants 
F I LED 
09 DEC 28 Pt1 I: 25 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner, 
husband and wife; Nola Garner, a widow and 
Nola Garner as Trustee of the Nola Garner 
Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Hal 1. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon C. 
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey 1. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees 
of the Jeffery 1. Neigum and Kathleen A 
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September 
17, 2004; Jeffery 1. Neigum and Kathleen A. 
N eigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and 
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First 
American Title Insurance Company, a 
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho 
Certificate of Authority; and First American 
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
BLAKE S. ATKIN IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES 
Case No. CV-08-342 
Judge Dunn 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
SS: 
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN ) 
Blake S. Atkin, having been first duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I am attorney of record for the Povey Defendants in the above entitled matter. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein. 
3. Attached hereto is a supplemental printout ofthe Costs and attorney fees incurred 
by the Povey Defendants in this matter. 
4. My normal hourly rate is $450.00 per hour, but in this matter I billed only 
$200.00 per hour. As the Court can see from perusal of the attachment, I am careful not to bill 
for any work that is not absolutely necessary, and given my number of years litigating cases I am 
able to reduce the number of hours billed by pinpointing the work that actually needs to be done. 
5. I am familiar with the rates charged in this community for attorney fees and given 
the nature of this litigation and the level of skill involved and considering the other factors set 
out in Rule 54, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure it is my opinion that the rates charged by me and 
my staff are reasonable. 
6. These costs and attorney fees were all reasonably and necessarily incurred in the 
defense of this matter. 
DATED this 0-day of December, 2009. 
iJ4!~-
Blake S. Atkin 
Attonley for the Povey Defendants 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me this 2!i day of December, 2009. 
~~ otafYPUbiiC ~ 
My Commission expires: O[/pj;tJ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _ day of December, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE S. ATKIN IN SUPPORT 
OF MEMORANDUM OF COSTS INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES upon the following by 
the method of delivery designated: 
Gordon S. Thatcher 
Michael Brown 
Thatcher, Beard, S1. Clair, Gaffney 
116 S. Center 
P.O. Box 216 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Franklin County Court 
39 West Oneida 
Preston, Idaho 83263 
Judge Stephen S. Dunn 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
2L US. Mail __ Hand Delivery Fax 
2L US. Mail _Hand Delivery Fax 
2L US. Mail _Hand Delivery Fax 
Blake S. Atkin 
GARNER V. POVEY 
FEES LISTING 
Working 
Date Explanation lawyer Hours Rate Amount 
Nov 5/2008 Meeting in Clifton BSA 6.00 200.00 $ 1,200.00 
Jan 29/2009 Research on motion to dismiss standards; JVM 5.50 175.00 $ 962.50 
research on pleadings facts that act as bar 
to complaint 
Feb 2/2009 Reviewing complaint; meeting with client; BSA 6.00 200.00 $ 1,200.00 
preparing motion to dismiss 
Feb 4/2009 preparing notice of appearance and motion MLS 0.80 90.00 $ 72.00 
and memo to dismiss; mailing and copying 
docs. 
Feb 4/2009 preparing notice of hearing on defendants' MLS 0.30 90.00 $ 27.00 
motion to dismiss amended complaint 
Feb 4/2009 faxing notice of hearing to opposing counsel MLS 0.60 90.00 $ 54.00 
and court 
Feb 21/2009 Reply to motion to dismiss BSA 6.00 200.00 $ 1,200.00 
Feb 23/2009 Prep for hearing BSA 3.00 200.00 $ GOO.OO 
Feb 23/2009 Reply in supp of M to Dismiss legal research JHP 3.10 150.00 $ 465.00 
Feb 24/2009 editing and preparing reply in support of MLS 1.00 90.00 $ 90.00 
motion to dismiss; faxing and mailing to 
opposing counsel and court 
Feb 25/2009 Prep for hearing on motion to dismiss BSA 5.00 200.00 $ 1,000.00 
Feb 26/2009 Hearing on motion to dismiss BSA 4.00 200.00 $ 800.00 
Mar 3/2009 Affidavits of Ivan Jensen and Ron Kendall BSA 2.00 200.00 $ 400.00 
Mar 4/2009 Affidavit of twin lakes BSA 1.00 200.00 $ 200.00 
Mar 4/2009 legal research on hearsay in idaho for case JHP 0.40 150.00 $ 60.00 
Mar 6/2009 Working on affidavits of Ron Kendall and BSA 1.00 200.00 $ 200.00 
Ivan Jensen 
Mar 11/2009 Affidavits BSA 1.00 200.00 $ 200.00 
Mar 30/2009 Answerto second amended complaint BSA 4.00 200.00 $ 800.00 
Mar 31/2009 reviewing amended complaint and second MLS 2.00 90.00 $ 180.00 
amended complaint for differences 
Mar 31/2009 Research re: warranty of title where not BSA 8.00 200.00 $ 1,600.00 




Answer to second amended complaint 
scanning and emailing copy of Thatcher 




8.00 200.00 $ 1,600.00 
0.30 90.00 $ 27.00 
, 
Apr 3/2009 Answer to second amended complaint and BSA 4.00 200.00 $ 800.00 
affidavits 
Apr 6/2009 Answer to a2d amended complaint BSA 2.00 200.00 $ 400.00 
Apr 13/2009 Preparation of discovery requests BSA 3.00 200.00 $ 600.00 
Apr 18/2009 Discovery requests BSA 2.00 200.00 $ 400.00 
Apr 21/2009 drafting and preparing discovery requests MLS 1.80 90.00 $ 162.00 
and interrogatories for mailing to opposing 
counsel; researching Idaho rules of civil 
procedure for definitions and instructions 
to discovery requests; phone call and email 
to Blake re issues with discovery 
Apr 22/2009 Discovery requests research re: warranty of BSA 5.00 200.00 $ 1,000.00 
title re: easement not described 
Apr 24/2009 editing, scanning, copying and preparing MLS 0.40 90.00 $ 36.00 
discovery (interrogs and req. for 
admissions) for mailing to opposing counsel 
and cert of service to court 
Apr 28/2009 Research BSA 1.00 200.00 $ 200.00 
Apr 29/2009 calling court to confirm room for MLS 0.40 90.00 $ 36.00 
depositions; drafting and preparing notice 
of depositions; call to court reporter to 
reserve 
Apr 29/2009 copying, scanning, faxing and mailing out MLS 0.60 90.00 $ 54.00 
notice of depositions to opposing counsel, 
court, judge and court reporter 
May 22/2009 Depos prep BSA 1.00 200.00 $ 200.00 
May 25/2009 Preparing for depositions BSA 2.00 200.00 $ 400.00 
May 26/2009 Prep for depositions BSA 2.00 200.00 $ 400.00 
May 27/2009 Prep for depos call to counsel re: documents BSA 1.00 200.00 $ 200.00 
May 29/2009 Prep for depos BSA 3.00 200.00 $ 600.00 
Jun 1/2009 Prep for depos BSA 6.00 200.00 $ 1,200.00 
Jun 2/2009 Deposition of Nola Garner BSA 8.00 200.00 $ 1,600.00 
Jun 3/2009 Deposition of Dan Garner BSA 8.00 200.00 $ 1,600.00 
Jun 8/2009 Drafting motion for summary judgment BSA 3.00 200.00 $ 600.00 
Jun 10/2009 Summary judgment motion BSA 3.00 200.00 $ GOO.OO 
Jun 11/2009 Summary judgment motion BSA 4.00 200.00 $ 800.00 





Motion for Summary Judgment 












Jun30/2oo9 editing and reviewing the mm in support of MLS 0.40 90.00 $ 36.00 
motion for summary judgment 
Jul 7/2009 editing and reviewing the mm in supp of MSJ MLS 0.60 90.00 $ 54.00 
Jul 7/2009 drafting motion in support of motion for MLS 0.50 90.00 $ 45.00 
summary judgment; editing and formatting mm 
in supp of motion for summary judgment 
Ju11O/2009 reading through deposition testimony for MLS 0.50 90.00 $ 45.00 
citations to be used in MSJ; inputing 
citations from depositions and westlaw 
research into MSJ. 
Aug 3/2009 working on placing deposition citations into MLS 0.70 90.00 $ 63.00 
motion and memorandum for summary judgment; 
researching case law on breach of warranty; 
Aug 18/2009 editing and reviewing final draft of motion MLS 2.20 90.00 $ 198.00 
for summary judgment; comparing deposition 
changes to citations in msj; phone call with 
Blake re same 
Aug 24/2009 call to clients re MSJ MLS 0.10 90.00 $ 9.00 
Aug 25/2009 phone call with client re msj MLS 0.40 90.00 $ 36.00 
Aug 26/2009 phone call with client re MSJ changes MLS 0.30 90.00 $ 27.00 
Aug 29/2009 Review of last draft of sjm BSA 3.00 200.00 $ 600.00 
Aug 31/2009 editing and reviewing final draft of MSJ MLS 4.60 90.00 $ 414.00 
with new additions 
Sep 1/2009 editing and additing in final citations to MLS 3.10 90.00 $ 279.00 
MSJ; scanning, copying and preparing same 
for mailing 
Sep 3/2009 drafting notice of hearing; 5 min; preparing MLS 0.30 90.00 $ 27.00 
fax cover sheets; faxing to all opp counsel, 
court and judge; drafting letter to clients 
re settlement agreement (5 min); 
Sep 15/2009 Stipulation for court - discussions with BSA 2.00 200.00 $ 400.00 
opposing counsel 
Sep 16/2009 Drafting settlement letter BSA 2.00 200.00 $ 400.00 
Sep 21/2009 Motion to strike affidavits, opposition to BSA 8.00 200.00 $ 1,600.00 
motion to strike affidavits 
Sep 22/2009 Opposition to motion to amend, opposition to BSA 6.00 200.00 $ 1,200.00 
motion to strike affidavits 
Sep 23/2009 reply sjm BSA 6.00 200.00 $ 1,200.00 
Sep 24/2009 adding deposition citations to motion to MLS 0.70 90.00 $ 63.00 
strike affidavits (30min); formatting and 
adding deposition citations to opp to mot 
Sep 24/2009 
Sep 24/2009 
for enlargement of time 












Sep 25/2009 adding citations from depositions to mm in MLS 1.40 90.00 $ 126.00 
opp to motion to strike affidavits; adding 
citations to reply msj 
Sep 25/2009 worked on motions and reply's to their 56(f) JHP 6.80 150.00 $ 1,020.00 
motion, motion to amend, reply in supp of 
our MSJ all in preparation for MSJ hearing 
that is coming up beginning of October. 
Sep25/2oo9 Typing interrogatories into system AG 1.00 90.00 $ 90.00 
Sep 28/2009 reading through depositions for citations MLS 2.60 90.00 $ 234.00 
for mm in opp to motion to strike, mm in opp 
to motion for leave to amend; editing and 
formatting aff of Brad Povey (10 min); 
editing and formatting aff of BSA (15min); 
Sep 28/2009 worked on motions and reply's to their 56(f) JHP 5.00 150.00 $ 750.00 
motion, motion to amend, reply in supp of 
our MSJ all in preparation for MSJ hearing 
that is coming up beginning of October. 
Sep 28/2009 reply sjm BSA 4.00 200.00 $ 800.00 
Sep29/2oo9 editing and reviewing final drafts of mm in MLS 2.00 90.00 $ 180.00 
supp of mot to strike aff of garner and 
povey, motion re same; editing and reviewing 
final draft of mm in opp to mot for 
enlargement of time (15 min); editing and 
reviewing final draft of mm in opp to mot to 
amend 2nd amended complaint (20min) 
Sep 29/2009 reply MM in supp of MSJ plus finalize other JHP 3.50 150.00 $ 525.00 
Pavey docs to be filed today 
Sep30/2009 adding citations to reply mm in supp of msj; MLS 2.50 90.00 $ 225.00 
editing and reviewing same 
Sep 30/2009 Supervising finalization of citations BSA 1.00 200.00 $ 200.00 
Oct 1/2009 preparing argument folder for hearing on MLS 3.20 90.00 $ 288.00 
10/6; printing cases from westlaw, all 
pleadings related to 5 motions, etc. 
Oct 1/2009 final research for Reply in Supp of MSJ and JHP 1.00 150.00 $ 150.00 
finalize for filing. 
Oct 2/2009 preparing argument folder for 10/6 hearing MLS 1.70 90.00 $ 153.00 
on msj and other motions; printing cases 
from westlaw, etc. 
Oct 6/2009 Prep for and attend hearing on msj BSA 6.00 200.00 $ 1,200.00 
Oct 7/2009 editing and reviewing letter to opp counsel; MLS 0.10 90.00 $ 9.00 
scanning, copying and preparing same for 
mailing 
Oct 20/2009 discovery responses- doc requests and JHP 2.00 150.00 $ 300.00 
interrogs 
-1~~ 7 
Oct 20/2009 editing and reviewing second request for 
production of documents, adding in 
definitions re same; editing and reviewing 
responses to first interrogs from 
plaintiffs, adding in general objections; 
preparing certs of service re discovery above 
MLS 1.20 90.00 $ 108.00 
Oct20!2009 inserting dictation into letterhead for opp MLS 0.20 90.00 $ 18.00 
counsel re stipulated statement; copying, 
scanning and preparing same for mailing 
Nov 2/2009 Preparing findings and conclusions BSA 3.00 200.00 $ 600.00 
Nov 3/2009 Findings and conclusions BSA 3.00 200.00 $ 600.00 
Nov 4/2009 Motion for atty fees, and judgment BSA 4.00 200.00 $ 800.00 
Nov 9/2009 editing and formatting mm of costs including MLS 1.50 90.00 $ 135.00 
atty fees; copying, scanning and preparing 
same (with all affidavits) for mailing to 
court and opp counsel 
Nov 9/2009 Memo of costs BSA 3.00 200.00 $ 600.00 
Nov 30/2009 Reading their motion to disallow atty fees BSA 1.00 200.00 $ 200.00 
Dec 1/2009 Reply re: atty fees BSA 4.00 200.00 $ 800.00 
Dec 2/2009 editing and formatting reply brief in supp MLS 1.10 90.00 $ 99.00 
of motion for costs and affidavit; 
Dec 3/2009 Reply atty fees BSA 5.00 200.00 $ 1,000.00 
Dec 3/2009 Reply re: fees research various issues BSA 3.00 200.00 $ 600.00 
Dec 4/2009 Reply to costs BSA 4.00 200.00 $ 800.00 
Dec 5/2009 Reply re: fees BSA 1.00 200.00 $ 200.00 
Dec 6/2009 Reply re: fees BSA 2.00 200.00 $ 400.00 
Dec 8/2009 research re: 120(3) BSA 3.00 200.00 $ 600.00 
Dec 9/2009 Reply on costs BSA 3.00 200.00 $ 600.00 
Dec 16/2009 reveiw Reply in supp of Att fees request JHp 1.50 150.00 $ 225.00 
Dec 17/2009 editing and reviewing reply mm, drafting MLS 1.50 90.00 $ 135.00 
supplmental aff of fees, and aff re 
settlement negotiations 





Jun 19/2009 Court Reporter - Deposition of Nola Garner $ 1,057.25 
Jun 24/2009 Court Reporter - Deposition of Daniel S. Garner $ 1,057.00 
Jun 24/2009 Court Reporter - Deposition of Sherri-Jo Garner $ 245.50 
Total Other S 2,359.75 
Faxes 
Feb 2/2009 Faxes 16 @ 0.50 $ 8.00 
Feb 24/2009 Faxes 8 @ 0.50 $ 4.00 
Apr 29/2009 Faxes 10 @ 0.50 $ 5.00 
Sep 29/2009 Faxes 207 @ 0.50 $ 103.50 
Oct 1/2009 Faxes 87 @ 0.50 S 43.50 
Oct 20/2009 Faxes 20 @ 0.50 $ 10.00 
Nov 6/2009 Faxes 15 @ 0.50 $ 7.50 
Total Faxes $ 181.50 
Postage 
Feb 5/2009 Postage $ 3.S1 
Feb 24/2009 Postage $ 5.34 
Apr 7/2009 Postage $ 4.66 
Apr 24/2009 Postage $ 4.52 
Apr 29/2009 Postage $ 6.34 
Sep 1/2009 Postage $ 26.30 
Sep 21/2009 Postage $ 0.44 
Sep 28/2009 Postage $ 0.61 
Sep 29/2009 Postage $ 8.76 
Oct 1/2009 Postage $ 4.68 
Oct 7/2009 Postage $ 0.44 
Oct 12/2009 Postage $ 0.44 
Oct 20/2009 Postage $ 0.44 
Oct 20/2009 Postage $ 3.66 
Nov 6/2009 Postage $ 2.64 
Nov 9/2009 Postage $ 6.92 
Total Postage $ 79.70 
long distance 
Sep 19/2009 long distance 2.70 @ 0.20 $ 0.54 
Total Long distance $ 0.54 
Photoco(,!igs 
Feb 5/2009 Photocopies 45 @ 0.20 $ 9.00 
Feb 6/2009 Photocopies 3 @ 0.20 $ 0.60 
Feb 24/2009 Photocopies 42 @ 0.20 $ 8.40 
Apr 7/2009 Photocopies 24 @ 0.20 $ 4.80 
Apr 24/2009 Photocopies 50 @ 0.20 $ 10.00 
Apr 29/2009 Photocopies 54 @ 0.20 $ 10.80 
Sep 1/2009 Photocopies 940 @ 0.20 $ 188.00 
Sep 21/2009 Photocopies 4 @ 0.20 $ 0.80 
-1d~ 10 
Sep 28/2009 Photocopies 9 @ 0.20 $ 1.80 
Sep 29/2009 Photocopies 312 @ 0.20 $ 62.40 
Oct 1/2009 Photocopies 174 @ 0.20 $ 34.80 
Oct 7/2009 Photocopies 1 @ 0.20 $ 0.20 
Oct 12/2009 Photocopies 1 @ 0.20 $ 0.20 
Oct 20/2009 Photocopies 1 @ 0.20 $ 0.20 
Oct 20/2009 Photocopies 34 @ 0.20 $ 6.80 
Nov 6/2009 Photocopies 10 @ 0.20 $ 2.00 
Nov 9/2009 Photocopies 128 @ 0.20 $. 25.60 
























Total On-Une Research 
Overnight Shipping 
Dvernight Shipping 
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FILE D JeffreyD. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
Michael W. Brown, ISB No. 8017 
343 E. 4th N. 09 DEC 29 PM 4: 23 
P.O. Box216 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Tel: (208) 359-5885 
Fax: (208) 359-5888 
jeff@beardstc1air.com 
mbrown@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO 
Daniel S. Garner and Sheri-Jo Gamer, 
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow; 
and Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola 
Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Case No. CV-08-342 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband MOTION TO STRIKE THE 
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY J. NEIGUM 
C. Viehweg. husband and wife; Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as 
Trustees of the Je:lfrey J. Neigum and 
Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust, 
dated September 17, 2004; Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and KathleenA. Neigum, husband 
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey, 
husband and wife; .First American Title 
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title 
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of 
Authority; and First American Title 
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
The plaintiffs, Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Gamer, husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a 
widow; and Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola Garner Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007 
Motion to Strike - Page 1 
12-29-09;04:04PM; 
(Garners), through counsel, Thatcher Beard st. Clair Gaffuey PA, respectfully request the Court 
to strike the affidavit of Jeffrey J. Neigum, dated October 24~ 2009. The general basis for this 
motion is that the contents of Mr. Neigum's October 24,2009 affidavit are impertinent, 
inappropriate, and irrelevant for purposes of detennining whether the defendant Poveys are 
entitled to an award of attorney fees. Specifically, paragraph three lacks foundation for the 
assertion that the Garners never used the northern roadway. In paragraph five, Mr. Neigum 
improperly seeks to testify for the Garners as to the effect of certain actions of Brad Povey and as 
to the Garners' intentions. Oral argument is requested. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of December, 2009. 
~aJ~ 
Michael W. Brown 
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffhey, Attorneys 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
Motion to Strike - Page 2 
'# 3/ 7 
12-29-09;04:04PM; 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho, I have my office in Rexburg, 
Idaho, and on December 29,2009, I served a true and correct copy of Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit of Jeffrey·J. Neigum on the following individuals by the method of delivery designated: 
Blake S. Atkin 
837 South 500 West 
Suite 200 
Bountiful, vr 84010 
Fax: (801) 533-0380 
Franklin County Courthouse 
39W. Oneida 
Preston, ID 83263 
Fax: (208) 852-2926 
Judge Stephen S. Dunn 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center 
P.O. Box 4126 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Dated: December 29, 2009 
Iil U.S. Mail IblJ Hand-delivered ~imile 
IblJ U.S. Mail IblJ Hand-delivered ~csimile 
IiJ U.S. Mail III Hand-delivered ~Simil~ 
lciW:wnJ1j{ ~ 
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney, Attorneys 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
Motion to Strike - Page 3 
# 4/ 7 
01/05/~13113 11:38 8131533 
Blake S. Atkin ISB# 6903 
. 7579 North Westside Highway 
Clifton, Idaho 83228 . 
, Telephone: (208) 747-3414 
. ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C . 
. 837 South 500 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533~0300 
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380 
Attorneys for the P ovey Defendants 
ATKIN LAW OFFI PAGE 132/135 
F I LED 
10 JAN - 6 Pt112: I 8 
iJt"HT '{ 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND Fo.R 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
Dani.eI S. Garner and Sherri~Jo Gamer, 
bu.<;band and wife; Nola Garn.er, a widow and 
Nola. Gamer as Trustee of the Nola Garner 
Living Tru.st, dated July 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
v . 
. Hal .T. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and "Nife, Douglas K. Viehweg and. Sharon C. 
Viehweg, husband and wife, Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as Trustees 
·of the Jeffery 1. Neigum and. Kathleen A 
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September 
17, 2004; Jeffery J. NeiguI11 and Kathleen A. 
. Neigum, husband and wife; Brad Povey and 
Leiza Povey, husband and wife; First 
American Title Insurance Company, a 
Foreign Title Insurer with an Idaho 
Certificate of Authority; and First American 
Title Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVJT 
OF .JEFFREY J. NEIGUM 
Case No. CV -08-342 
ludgeDunn 
1211105/'2010 11:38 80153 ATKIN LAW OFFI PAGE 03/05 
Defendants Brad and Leiza Povey, by and through wldersigned counsel, hereby submit 
this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Jeffrey J. 
Neigum. Plaintiffs have m.oved to strike the Affidavit of Jeffrey J. Neigum on the ground that it 
is "impertinent, inappropriate, and irrelevant". The motion is not well founded. The Affidavit of 
Jeffrey J. Neigum (herinafter "Neigum Affidavit") complies with Rule 56(e)~ Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, is competent evidence of pursuit of a frivolous claim for illicit purposes, and 
should not be stricken. 
I. THE NEIGUM AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT CONTAIN INADMISSmLE 
HEARSAY. 
Plaintiffs do not articulate the grolmds for moving to strike ~5 of the Neigum Affidavit, 
but apparently are arguing tbat the paragraph contains inadmissible hearsay. They argue, "[i]n 
paragraph five, M1'. Neigum improperly seeks to testify for the Garners as to the effect of certain 
actions of Brad Povey and as to the Garners' intentions." See, Motion to Strike the Affidavit of 
Jeffrey J. Neigum, in Court File. 
Paragraph 5 lays out that Mr, Neigum is recounting statements made to him by Plaintiff, 
Dan Garner. 
He even told me some of the details about the trouble between him 
and Brad Povey. He told me that Brad had intervened with Brad's 
father (the grandfather of Dan Garner's wife, Sherri.Jo,) to kccp 
llim from selling to Dan and Sherri-Jo the Troy Grave's dair.Y. 
That intervention by Brad had made Dan and Sherri-.To very angry 
with Brad and that is why Dan wanted to make us mad so that we 
would sue Brad." 
The statements are not hearsay at all. The affidavit cannot be stri.cken. 
Under Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(1), "A statement is not hearsay if-.: .... (2) 
01/05/2010 11:38 801533 ATKIN LAW OFFI PAGE 04/05 
The statement is offered against a party and is . .. (A) The parties own statement." 
These statements by Dan Gamer are not hearsay and cannot be stricken. 
Plaintiffs do not bother to explain why they think the affidavit is impertinent, but 
Defendants have been unable to find any law that would suggest impertinence is a. ground for 
striking an affidavit. The Neigwn Affidavit is clearly relevant, spelling out as it does that Dan 
Gamer claimed he was trying to embroil. the Poveys in litigation in order to get even with them. 
When he could not get the others to sue the Poveys, he did it himself. Seldom does one have 
bettor evidence of abuse of civil process than this: 
DATED TIDS 6th day of January, 2010. 
ATKIN LAW OFFICS, P.C 
Blake S. Atkin 
Attorney for the Pavey Defendants 
3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6th day of January, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF .JEFFREY J. NEIGUM upon the followin.g by the method of delivery 
designated: 
Gordon S. Thatcher 
Thatcher, Beard, St. Clair, Gaffney 
116 S. Center 
P.O. Box 216 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Facsimile: (208) 359-5888 
Eric Olsen 
RaciJle~ Olson Nye Budge & Bailey 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Facsimile: (208) 232-6109 
Ryan McFarland 
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Facsimile: (208) 954-5236 
Franklin County Court 
39 West Oneida 
Preston. Idaho 83263 
Facsimile: (208) 852-2926 
Judge Stephen S. Dunn 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello,Idaho 83201 
Facsimile: (208) 236·7208 
_X..;. U.S. Mail_Hand delivery _X_ Fax 
_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery _X_ Fax 
p_ U.S. Mail_Hand delivery X Fax 
x U.S. Mail_Hand delivery X Fax 
_X_ U.S. Mail_Hand Delivery _X_Fax 
Blake S. Atkin 
4 
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F I LED Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
Michael W. Brown, ISB No. 8017 
343 E. 4th N. 10 JAN I 2 Mill: 1 0 
P.O. Box 216 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
Tel: (208) 359-5885 
Fax: (208) 359-5888 
jeff@beardstclair.com 
mbrown@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FRANKLIN COUNTY IDAHO 
Daniel S. Gamer and Sheri-Jo Gamer, 
husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a widow; 
and Nola Gamer as Trustee of the Nola 
Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Hal J. Dean and Marlene T. Dean, husband 
and wife, Douglas K. Viehweg and Sharon 
C. Viehweg, husband and wife; Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, as 
Trustees of the Jeffrey J. Neigum and 
Kathleen A. Neigum Revocable Trust, 
dated September 17,2004; Jeffrey J. 
Neigum and Kathleen A. Neigum, husband 
and wife; Brad Povey and Leiza Povey, 
husband and wife; First American Title 
Insurance Company, a Foreign Title 
Insurer with an Idaho Certificate of 
Authority; and First American Title 
Company, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-342 
REPLY MEMORANDUM RE: 




The plaintiffs, Daniel S. Gamer and Sherri-Jo Gamer, husband and wife; Nola Gamer, a 
widow; and Nola Gamer as Trustee ofthe Nola Gamer Living Trust, dated July 19, 2007 
REPLY MEMORANDUM RE: MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES PAGE 1 
(Garners), through counsel, Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA, respectfully submit the 
following reply memorandum in support of their motion to disallow costs and fees.! 
INTRODUCTION 
Attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) are awarded to the prevailing party in a 
lawsuit only where a commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. Where 
there is no commercial transaction, § 12-120(3) does not provide a basis for an award of 
attorney's fees. Moreover, the mere characterization of or existence of some remote! y related 
commercial transaction between parties to an action does not support an award of attorney's fees 
under § 12-120(3). In this case, the 1992 conveyance of real property from the Poveys to Gary 
Gamer and Nola Gamer was relevant to the issues litigated insofar as it established how the 
Garners acquired ownership of and warranty of title to some of the property west of the Twin 
Lakes Canal, but it was not the gravamen of the lawsuit. Instead, the Poveys' discrete actions of 
1) conveying servient estate properties to third parties; and 2) physically obstructing the Garners' 
easement access to their property prompted the Garners' lawsuit and constituted the gravamen of 
the lawsuit. These discrete actions arose entirely independentl y of the 1992 conveyance from the 
Poveys to Gary and Nola. Thus, even if the 1992 conveyance of real estate was a commercial 
transaction,2 it was not the gravamen of this lawsuit and by itself did not give rise to any of the 
Garners' claims. 
Attorney's fees under § 12-121 are appropriate only in extraordinary circumstances 
where a party has brought or pursued a claim frivolously or without foundation or merit. Fees 
I Although the Poveys apparently filed their responsive memorandum on December 24,2009, counsel for the 
Garners did not receive a copy of it until after 5:00 p.m. on January 5,2010. Due to the number of substantive 
issues the Garners were required to address in their reply brief, and due to the fact that three days before the hearing 
on this motion fell on a Sunday, the Court should, in the interest of justice, consider this memorandum. 
2 The Garners nevertheless maintain that the 1992 conveyance of the real estate in this case is not a commercial 
transaction for purposes of awarding attorney's fees under § 12-120(3). 
REPLY MEMORANDUM RE: MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES - PAGE 2 
under this statute are discretionary with the court and are not awarded against a nonprevailing 
party as a matter of right. In this case, although the Garners did not ultimately prevail in their 
claims against the Poveys, the record supports a finding that the Garners pursued their claims in 
good faith and relied on plausible legal theories and valid legal authority to support them. 
ARGUMENT 
The Poveys' claim for attorney's fees fails to meet the requirements ofIdaho Code §§ 12-
120(3) and 12-121. Because there is no other basis for an award of attorney's fees, the Court 
should disallow the Poveys' claimed attorney's fees. 
I. The 1992 real estate conveyance is not a commercial transaction under § 12-120(3). 
The Poveys' conveyance of real estate to Gary Gamer and Nola Gamer in 1992 is not a 
commercial transaction for purposes of awarding attorney's fees in this case. In their first brief, 
the Garners assert that "the term commercial transaction is not generally applied to real estate 
transactions, or to issues involving the ownership of property." Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. 
State of Idaho, 132 Idaho 673, 677, 978 P.2d 233, 237 (1999). The Poveys respond by 
insinuating that this rule is no longer good law because ofthe Idaho Court of Appeals decision in 
Herrick v. Leuzinger, 900 P .2d 201, 214 (Id. Ct. App. 1995). See Defs.' Mem. Resp. Mot. 
Disallow Costs at 2-3. The Poveys are mistaken. As recently as 2008 the Idaho Supreme Court 
endorsed and cited the rule in Treasure Valley when it explained, "This Court has upheld a lower 
court's ruling that commercial transactions generally do not include real estate transactions or 
issues involving the ownership of property, such as an action to quiet title." Anderson v. Rex 
Hayes Family Trust, 145 Idaho 741, 745, 185 P.3d 253,257 (Idaho 2008). 
The present case is similar to Anderson and other property cases in which courts have 
consistently declined to award attorney's fees under § 12-120(3). See, e.g., C & G Inc. v. Rule, 
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135 Idaho 763, 25 P.3d 76 (2001)(where the court declined to award attorney's fees because 
dispute focused on real property issues). The Poveys argue that C & G should not apply to the 
present case "since the Poveys never disputed the Gamer' [sic] property rights, and Plaintiffs' 
claims against Poveys could not result in a determination of any property lights." Defs.' Mem. 
Resp. Mot. Disallow Costs at 3-4. This argument fails. In fact, the majority of the present case 
focused on real property issues. For example, the Poveys went to great lengths to dispute the 
Garners' easement interest in the so-called northern roadway. A significant portion of the 
summary judgment proceedings in this case was devoted to determining whether the Poveys had 
the right to unilaterally designate the location of the Garner easement.3 The Court's ultimate 
determination that the Poveys had no right to relocate the Garner easement certainly resulted in a 
"determination of property rights." Another example of how this case focused on real property 
issues is the parties' arguments about the effect ofthe deed by which Daniel Garner acquired his 
property. The Poveys based much of their argument on the fact that Daniel Garner's deed 
contained no explicit reference to the northern roadway, and a detennination of this property 
issue influenced the outcome of the case. With these substantive issues the parties litigated in 
mind, the Court should apply the Idaho Supreme Court's rule articulated in Treasure Valley and 
confirmed in Anderson by declining to treat the 1992 real estate transaction as a commercial 
transaction. 
II. Even if the 1992 conveyance was a commercial transaction, it still does not support 
an award of attorney's fees under §12-120(3). 
Even if the 1992 conveyance is deemed a commercial transaction, it cannot provide the 
basis for an award of attorney's fees because its connection to the Garners' claims was remote 
3 See Defs.' Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. 1. at 7-9. In their brief, the Poveys relied on Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 
Idaho 522, 817 P.2d 188 (1991) to support their argument that they were entitled to relocate the Gamer easement as 
long as they chose a reasonable and suitable location. 
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and it was not the basis upon which the Garners sought recovery. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
established that "[t]he critical test in determining whether a civil action is for a commercial 
transaction is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; it must 
be integral to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." 
Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 432, 196 P.3d 341, 350 (2008). "[T]he award of 
attorney's fees is not warranted every time a commercial transaction is remotely connected with 
the case." Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, 128 Idaho 72, 78, 910 P.2d 744,751 (1996)(citing Brovver 
v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345,349 (1990)). In this case, 
the 1992 conveyance was neither integral to the Garners' claims, nor was it the basis upon which 
the Garners sought recovery. Thus, an award of attorney's fees is not warranted. 
The Poveys argue strenuously that the 1992 conveyance was integral to the Gamers' 
claims because it was directly related to the Garners' breach of warranty claim.4 See Defs.' 
Mem. Resp. Mot. Disallow Costs at 6-9. This argument fails, however, because it 
misapprehends the relevance of the 1992 conveyance to the Garners' breach of warranty claim. 
Not one single aspect of the 1992 conveyance itself served as the basis on which the Gamers 
sought recovery.5 Instead, the Poveys' actions years after the 1992 conveyance (physical 
interference with the Garner easement and conveyance of servient estate properties to the Deans, 
Neigums, and Viehwegs without making the conveyed properties subject to the Gamer 
4 Section II of the Poveys memorandum asserts "The alleged breach ofw.arranty arising from Gary and Nola's 
purchase of the property from Poveys was the gravaman [sic] of Plaintiffs' complaint." See See Defs.' Mem. Resp. 
Mot. Disallow Costs at 5-6. 
5 Cf Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594 (2007). In Blimka, the Idaho Supreme Court 
determined that a commercial transaction was integral to the plaintiff's claim for fraud because the defendant's 
fraudulent statements during negotiations induced the plaintiff to enter the commercial transaction contemplated in 
the negotiations. Unlike in Blimka, where the defendant's conduct within the context of negotiating a commercial 
transaction was actionable and therefore the basis for recovery in the lawsuit, in the present case the Garners did not 
seek to recover based on any claimed actionable conduct by the Poveys within the context of the 1992 real estate 
transaction. The basis for recovery did not arise until years after the 1992 real estate transaction was closed and 
final. 
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easement) comprise the gravamen of the lawsuit and are the basis on which the Garners sought 
recovery. These actions are distinct and remote from the 1992 conveyance. 
The 1992 conveyance is relevant only because it was the means by which the Garners 
acquired some oftheir property west of the Twin Lakes Canal and because it endowed the 
Garners with certain property rights (such as warranty oftitle and the right not to have servient 
estate owners interfere with their easement) they argued were subsequently violated by the 
Poveys.6 The Garners have never complained or alleged that the Poveys' conduct in effecting 
the 1992 conveyance itself was wrongful. Thus, the 1992 conveyance is not the basis on which 
the Garners sought recovery. In order to understand that the 1992 conveyance is not the basis 
upon which the Garners sought recovery, the Court need only consider the likely course of 
events if the Poveys had not undertaken the post-1992 actions alleged by the Garners: The 
Garners would have had no reason to bring the lawsuit because the Viehwegs would have had no 
basis for believing they could erect a barrier obstructing the Garners' easement with impunity. 
III. The Garners' description in their complaint of a commercial transaction between 
the Poveys and Gary and Nola in 1992 does not trigger § 12-120(3). 
The Garners' characterization of the 1992 real estate conveyance as a commercial 
transaction in paragraph 37 of their second amended complaint does not per se trigger 
application of § 12-120(3), as urged by the Poveys. See Defs.' Mem. Resp. Mot. Disallow Costs 
at 5. In partially overruling its holding in Magic Lantern Productions, Inc. v. Dolsot, 126 Idaho 
805, 808, 892 P .2d 480, 483 (1995), the Idaho Supreme Court explained, "To the extent that 
Magic Lantern Productions, Inc. v. Dolsot may be read to mandate an award of attorney's fees to 
the prevailing party when the other party has claimed fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), that 
6 The Garners recognize that the court did not ultimately grant them relief based on the Poveys' actions that the 
Garners alleged were wrongful. Nevertheless, for purposes of detennining whether § 12-120(3) applies, the relevant 
issue is whether the acts complained a/by the Garners constitute a commercial transaction. Clearly, they do not. 
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interpretation is disavowed." Great Plains Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 
471,36 P.3d 218,223 (200l)(citation omitted). "A prevailing party may rely on I.e. § 12-120(3) 
ifpled by another party for recovery of attorney's fees ifit is warranted under the statute." !d. 
The upshot of this holding is that the Garners' mere assertion in their complaint that a 
commercial transaction existed does not, as a matter of law, entitle the Poveys as prevailing party 
to rely on § 12-120(3). Instead, the court still must conduct the necessary analysis to determine 
whether the commercial transaction (1992 real estate conveyance) alleged in the Garners' second 
amended complaint actually comprised the gravamen7 of the action. As explained by the Great 
Plains court, "The commercial transaction must be an actual basis of the complaint, that is, the 
lawsuit and the causes of action must be based on a commercial transaction, not simply a 
situation that can be characterized as a commercial transaction." Great Plains, 136 Idaho at 471, 
36 P.3d at 223 (internal citations omitted). "To hold otherwise would be to convert the award of 
attorney's fees from an exceptional remedy justified only by statutory authority to a matter of 
right in virtually every lawsuit filled." Id (citing Brower v. E.I DuPont De Nemours and Co., 
117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990)). Thus, the court must not award attorney's fees 
to the Poveys unless it determines that the 1992 real estate transaction was indeed the gravamen 
of this action. As argued above, the nexus between the 1992 real estate transaction and the 
events underlying the Garners' claims against the Poveys is too remote. The 1992 transaction 
was not the gravamen of this lawsuit. 
In support of their argument that paragraph 37 of the Garners' second amended complaint 
automatically triggers application of § 12-120(3), the Poveys cite Lexington Heights 
Development, LLC v. Crendlemire, 140 Idaho 276,92 P.3d 526 (2004) and Miller v. St. 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., 139 Idaho 825, 87 P.3d 934 (2004). The Poveys cite 
7 See Johannsen, 146 Idaho at 432, 196 P.3d at 350. 
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these cases for the proposition that "invocation by the plaintiff of a commercial transaction claim 
triggers the right to recover attorney's fees, even ifit later is shown that the claim was without 
merit or even that the commercial transaction never existed." Defs.' Mem. Resp. Mot. Disallow 
Costs at 5, fn. 3. As discussed above, a plaintiffs assertion of commercial transaction triggers 
the right to recover attorney's fees by the prevailing defendant only if the alleged commercial 
transaction was actually the gravamen of the lawsuit. Lexington Heights and Miller both 
illustrate this concept. 
In Lexington Heights, a developer entered into a contractual agreement to purchase 
approximately ninety acres from the Crandlemires for purposes of building a residential 
development. Subsequent to this agreement, the Crandlemires refused to close the sale with the 
developer and ultimately conveyed approximately forty of the ninety acres to a third party. The 
developer sued the Crandlemires and sought, amohg other forms of relief, specific performance 
of the agreement and damages for breach of the agreement. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Crandlemires because the original 
agreement between the developer and the Crandlemires contained an insufficient legal 
description. With respect to attorney's fees, the court ruled that the Crandlemires could be 
awarded attorney's fees pursuant to § 12-120(3) if, after resolution of their counterclaim against 
the developer (which was not addressed in the appealed grant of summary judgment), they were 
ultimately found to be the prevailing party. The court also reasoned that attorney's fees could be 
awardable to the Crandlemires under § 12-120(3) even though the contract on which the 
developer sued was found to be invalid. 
The present case is distinguishable from Lexington Heights. In Lexington Heights, the 
court held that attorney's fees could be awarded to the Crandlemires not simply because the 
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developer characterized the basis of its claims against the Crandlemires as a commercial 
transaction, but because the alleged contract (commercial transaction) actually was the basis for 
the lawsuit. In the present case, although the Garners characterized the 1992 real estate 
transaction between the Poveys and Gary and Nola Gamer as a commercial transaction, that 
transaction was not, in fact, the actual basis upon which the Garners sought recovery in this 
lawsuit. Instead, the Poveys' alleged interference with the Garners' easement was the basis. 
Miller is analogously distinguishable from the present case. In Miller, a physician 
applied for medical staff privileges at a hospital. The hospital granted the physician temporary 
privileges while it conducted a thorough review of the physician's background. After its review, 
the hospital determined the physician should not receive privileges, so it terminated his 
temporary privileges and denied his application. The physician sued the hospital and sought an 
injunction requiring the hospital to grant him privileges and damages for breach of a contract he 
alleged was created between the hospital and him. The trial court ruled in favor of the hospital 
and awarded attorney's fees under § 12-120(3). The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the award of 
attorney's fees because even though it found that no contract existed between the physician and 
the hospital, the physician had alleged that a contract existed. See Miller, 139 Idaho at 839,87 
P.3d at 948. The physician's mere allegation that a contract existed, however, was not the sole 
reason why the court awarded attorney's fees. Crucial to the court's determination that 
attorney's fees should be awarded was its finding that "[t]hefocus of the trial was whether the 
Hospital acted in good faith in the performance of its alleged contractual obligations." Id 
(emphasis added). Thus, the court awarded attorney's fees because the focus, or gravamen, of 
the trial was the alleged contractual agreement. In contrast to focus of the trial in Miller, the 
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focus in the present litigation was on actions and events8 that occurred long after the alleged 
commercial transaction. The facts in both Miller and Lexington Heights are sufficiently 
distinguishable from the present case that they should not be read to trigger application of § 12-
120(3) in the present case. 
IV. The Poveys are not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under § 12-121. 
The Court should not award attorney's fees under § 12-121 because the Garners brought 
their claims against the Poveys in good faith and based on legitimate facts and legal arguments. 
An award of attorney's fees under § 12-121 is within the sound discretion ofthe distIict court. 
Anderson v. Good/ifJe, 140 Idaho 446, 449 95 P.3d 64, 67 (2004). "An award of attorney's fees 
pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 is only proper when an action was either brought or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624, 
630,903 P.2d 1321, 1327 (1995). "Where a party's claim, though unsuccessful, is offered in 
good faith with no intent to delay or hinder justice, the district court does not abuse its discretion 
in denying attorney's fees." Id. at 630-31, 1327-28. 
The present case involved a complicated fact pattern and fairly sophisticated legal issues. 
The evidence adduced by the Garners in support of their claims against the Poveys generated at 
least debatable questions. Throughout the course of this litigation, the Garners relied on 
plausible legal theories that the Court, based on thoroughness of its written decisions, carefully 
considered. The fact that the Garners did not ultimately prevail in its claims against the Poveys 
is of no consequence in determining whether the Garners pursued their claims frivolously, 
8 For example, the issues that dominated this litigation were 1) whether the Poveys physically obstructed the Garner 
easement; 2) whether the Poveys had a right to relocate the Garner easement from the original (northern) roadway to 
the Neigum driveway (middle roadway); and 3) whether the manner in which the Poveys conveyed servient estate 
properties to the Deans, Neigums, and Viehwegs constituted actionable interference with the Garners' easement. 
None of these issues arose out of or were closely connected to the 1992 real estate transaction. The Garners' 
allegations that the Poveys' interfered with the Garner easement were the gravamen of the lawsuit. 
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unreasonably, or without foundation. See Herbst v. Botho! Dairies, Inc., 110 Idaho 971, 975, 
719 P.2d 1231, 1235 (1986)("The standard for detennining whether such an award should be 
made is not whether the position urged by the nonprevailing party is ultimately found to be 
wrong, but whether it is so plainly fallacious as to.be frivolo~s."). The Poveys have failed to 
show that the Garners' claims were "so plainly fallacious as to be frivolous." 
Instead of attempting to show why the Garners' actual legal claims were frivolous or 
without merit, the Poveys speculate that the Garners' entire pursuit of their claims against the 
Poveys was based on a desire for revenge. Defs.' Mem. Resp. Mot. Disallow Costs at 10-13. In 
support of their revenge theory, the Poveys cite the recently produced affidavit of Jeffrey J. 
Neigum. The Court should disregard the infonnation in this affidavit. The source of the 
affidavit is a fonner defendant in this lawsuit. The settlement agreement Mr. Neigum reached 
with the Garners requires Mr. Neigum to grant the Garners a widened easement over his 
"driveway," which was a point of contention throughout the settlement negotiations.9 Mr. 
Neigum's bias 1) as a fonner defendant who was sued by the Garners, and 2) as a servient estate 
owner whose property will soon be encumbered by an enlarged Gamer easement, negates the 
credibility of his affidavit. Moreover, Mr. Neigum's claim that Daniel Gamer said he had a 
personal vendetta against Brad Povey (which claim Daniel Gamer has rebutted and denied) in no 
way undennines the legitimacy or legal foundation of the claims the Garners asserted against the 
Poveys. Accordingly, the Court should focus its analysis on whether the Garners had a good 
faith basis and plausible legal arguments in support of their claims, not on a disgruntled fonner 
defendant's biased and controverted allegations. 
In support of their allegation that the Garners pursued their claims based on a retaliatory 
9 This requirement is significant because the settlement agreement requires the grant of an easement considerably 
wider than the Daniel Gamer easement identified in deed the Poveys gave to the Neigums. 
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motive against Brad Povey, the Poveys direct the Court's attention to the fact that the Garners 
did not sue Hank Povey and Melanie Povey, the other two grantors on the 1992 deed conveying 
property to Gary and Nola. According to the Poveys, the Gainers' decision not to sue Hank and 
Melanie proves the Garners sued only for the sake of seeking revenge against Brad Povey. This 
argument is flawed, and by making it, the Poveys inadvertently support the Garners' argument 
made in Section II herein. The Garners only sued Brad and Leiza (and not Hank and Melanie) 
because only Brad and/or Leiza were responsible for the actionable conduct (interfering with the 
Gamer easement) underlying the Garners' claims. 1o Thus, not only does the Garners' decision to 
sue only Brad and Leiza rebut the Poveys' theory of retaliatory motivation, it further proves that 
the 1992 real estate transaction was not the gravamen of the lawsuit. See generally Section II 
above. 
v. The Poveys' claimed costs and fees should be reduced because they are excessive or 
not permitted under Rule 54. 
Even if the Court decides to award attorney's fees, the fees awarded should be 
substantially reduced from the fees cited in the supplemental affidavit of Blake S. Atkin. Both § 
12-120(3) and § 12-121 provide for the award ofa reasonable attorney's fee. The attorney's 
fees claimed by counsel for the Poveys are excessive and not reasonable, given the amount of 
legal work reasonably necessary to defend against the claims brought by the Garners. 
Throughout the fees listing in Mr. Atkin's affidavit, there are numerous entries for tasks such as 
"editing, reviewing, preparing, and inserting citations," and many of these entries appear 
repeatedly with respect to the same particular document or activity. For example, the entries 
between August 29, 2009 and September 1,2009 are as follows: 
10 Hank Povey and Melanie Povey played no role in conveying servient estate properties to the Deans, Neigums, and 
Viehwegs. It would have been illogical to name Hank and Melanie as defendants when they did nothing to harm or 
injure the Garners. 




Review of last draft of sjm BSA 3.00 200.00 
editing and reviewing final MLS 4.60 90.00 
draft of MSJ with new 
additions 
editing and adding final MLS 3.10 90.00 
citations to MSJ; scanning, 





While it is understood that such tasks are necessary in litigation, the frequency with 
which these entries appear in Mr. Atkin's fee listing, and the amount oftime spent on them, 
renders the claimed fees excessive and unreasonable in this case. In the above example, 10.7 
hours of billable time to review and edit a summary judgment motion is excessive. Even if the 
Court determines to award attorney's fees, it should reduce such any such award to an an10unt 
that is reasonable under the circumstances of this case. 
The fees listing in Mr. Atkin's affidavit contains numerous items that are secretarial in 
nature and not awardable under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1), which provides for an 
award of attorney's fees and, at the court's discretion, paralegal fees, but not for secretarial time. 
See P.o. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 239, 159 P.3d 870, 
876 (2007). The following are illustrative, but not exhaustive: 
Feb 24/2009 editing and preparing reply MLS 1.00 90.00 $90.00 
in support of motion to dismiss; 
faxing and mailing to opposing 
counsel and court 
Apr 3/2009 scanning and emailing copy MLS 0.30 90.00 $27.00 
of Thatcher affidavit (100 plus 
pages) to Blake 
Apr 24/2009 editing, scanning, copying MLS 0.40 90.00 $36.00 
and preparing discovery (int-
errogs and req. for admissions) 
for mailing to opposing counsel 
and cert of service to court 
Apr 29/2009 calling court to confirm room for MLS 0.40 90.00 $36.00 
Depositions; drafting and prepar-
ing notice of depositions; call to 
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court reporter to reserve 
Apr 29/2009 copying, scanning, faxing and MLS 0.60 90.00 $54.00 
mailing out notice of depositions 
to opposing counsel, court, judge 
and court reporter 
Sep 1/2009 editing and additing [sic] in final MLS 3.10 90.00 $279.00 
citations to MSJ; copying and 
preparing same for mailing 
Sep 3/2009 drafting notice of hearing; 5 min; MLS 0.30 90.00 $27.00 
preparing fax cover sheets; faxing 
to all opp counsel, court and judge; 
drafting letter to clients re settlement 
agreement (5min); 
Oct 20/2009 inserting dictation into letterhead MLS 0.20 90.00 $18.00 
for opp counsel re stipulated 
statement; copying, scanning 
and preparing same for mailing 
The Court should strike all entries for secretarial functions from any award for attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should deny the Poveys' claim for attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 11 th day of January, 2010. 
~~"-~~/1?{~~~~~ :----
Michael W. Brown 
of Thatcher Beard St. Clair Gaffuey, Attorneys 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
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MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
On February 9, 2010, Michael D. Gaffney, counsel for Plaintiffs and Blake Atkin, counsel 
for Defendants, Brad and Leiza Povey appeared in Court. The Court notified the parties that no 
court reporter was available but the proceeding was being digitally recorded and asked if they 
wished to proceed in that manner. Counsel waived having a court reporter present. 
This matter was set for Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees. Mr. Gaffney additionally 
filed an Objection to Costs. The Court having reviewed the filings heard argument from counsel. 
After presentation of the argument the Court took this matter under advisement and will issue a 
written decision. 
IT SO ORDERED. 
DATED: February 9,2010 
Case No, CV-2008-342 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
POVEY DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES 
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Costs and Fees ("Motion") of the 
Defendants, Brad and Leiza Povey ("Poveys"). The Court has reviewed and considered all of 
the filings, both in favor of and in opposition to the Motion, the applicable law and the 
arguments of counsel provided at a hearing held on February 9,2010. The Court now issues its 
decision on the Motion. 1 
BACKGROUND AND FACTS2 
The Court focuses on the following facts and legal conclusions already made. On May 
22, 1987 Daniel Gamer acquired real property, by Warranty Deed, from Ralph R. and Thelma N. 
1 Poveys filed the Affidavit of Jeffrey Neigum in support of the Motion and Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike that 
Affidavit. That Motion is also under consideration herein and is decided below. 
2 The facts of this case were extensively set forth by the Court in the Memorandum Decision ("Decision") granting 
Poveys' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on October 27,2009, and are incorporated but not repeated here 
except as necessary to explain the Court's decision herein. When the Court refers to the "Complaint" it means the 
Second Amended Complaint filed March 13,2009, together with the exhibits attached to the original Complaint 
filed September 17,2008. Plaintiffs Daniel S. Garner and Sherri-Jo Garner are collectively referred to as "D. 
Gamer" and Plaintiff Nola Gamer, either individually or with Gary Garner, her husband, and as Trustee of the Nola 
Gamer Living Trust, are referred to as "N. Gamer." However, it is agreed that Daniel Garner is a party to the claim 
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McCulloch ("McCullochs,,).3 Although an underlying Contract of Sale with McCullochs 
referenced a right-of-way across McCulloch's remaining property, this Court ruled that the 
Contract of Sale was merged into the warranty deed which did not mention any right-of-way or 
easement.4 Nevertheless, the Court also concluded that D. Gamer acquired an easement across 
McCulloch's remaining property by prescription or prior use.5 
On May 23, 1990 Poveys acquired, by Warranty Deed, the remaining property owned by 
McCullochs.6 On June 17, 1992 Poveys conveyed, by Warranty Deed, property they owned on 
the west side of Twin Lakes Canal to N. Gamer.7 The deed from Poveys to N. Gamer did not 
mention any easement. While Poveys acknowledged that D. Gamer and N. Gamer have an 
easement across property Poveys retained after these transactions, they also contended that 
neither D. Gamer nor N. Gamer had an easement by agreement and that these easements could 
be moved or modified at Poveys' discretion.8 This Court held that there were no express 
easements, but the Court disagreed with Poveys' contention that D. Gamer and N. Gamer did not 
have an easement in the precise location of the Northern Road, also finding that Poveys did not 
have the right to unilaterally change the location of that easement.9 
brought by N. Garner, as an heir of Gary Gamer, who is deceased. Complaint, ~~ 14-15. Plaintiffs are collectively 
referred to as "Garners" or "Plaintiffs." 
3 See Complaint Exs. B-2, C and D. 
4 Decision, 11-14. 
5 Id., 17-22. 
6 Id., Ex. E. 
7 Id., Exs. F and B-3. 
8 Memorandum in Support of Defendant Brad and Leiza Poveys' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2: ';In order to 
detennine if Summary Judgment is appropriate in favor of the Povey Defendants, the Court needs to make two 
determinations: First is whether the Garners have a right to use the particular portion of the roadway that became 
blocked by the fence, or whether their right of access could be satisfied by what Garners themselves term 'a 
replacement access road,' that existed long before the fence was built. See Second Amended Complaint, at ~~ 18, 
and 22 in Court file, ... The answer to both those inquiries is no." (Emphasis added). P.5: "The Garners have no 
right to a particular access route, but only a reasonable access." (Emphasis added). P. 6: "Under the cases cited 
above, Brad Povey could have unilaterally designated the path of the roadway, and as long as it was a convenient 
and suitable way, the law would uphold his designation." 
9 Decision, 14-22. 
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Between August 27, 1999 and October 4, 2005, Poveys conveyed portions of their 
remaining property to Defendants Dean, Neigum, and Viehweg. The deed to Dean transferred 
both easements of record and those which were visible on the premises. IO The transfer to 
Neigum mentioned an easement in the Neigum Driveway or the Replacement Access Road but 
did not mention the Northern Road. II The transfer to Viehweg was for property that did impact 
the Northern Road but that deed did not mention any easement. 12 On May 28, 2008 Viehweg 
constructed a fence across part of the Northern Road, obstructing Garners access to the easement 
they had been using. 
The Complaint alleges that Poveys purchased their propetiy from McCullochs subject to 
D. Garner's easement and that they sold property to N. Garner subject to an easement in favor of 
N. Garner. The Complaint also asserts that Poveys interfered with Garners' easements by 
plowing over the Northern Road and by wrongfully conveying property to Dean, Neigum, and 
Viehweg without protecting Garners' easements in the Northern Road. Garners brought the 
action against Poveys "to preserve their right-of-way and to recover damages" for Poveys' 
"wrongful conduct in seeking to extinguish the right-of-way_ ... ,,13 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Typically, in any determination of an award of costs and fees, the threshold question is 
which party prevailed. LR.C.P. 54(e)(l) states: "In any civil action the court may award 
reasonable attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the 
prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54( d)(1 )(B), when provided for by any statute or 
contract." [Emphasis added]. LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) governs the prevailing party issue: 
10 See Complaint Exs. K and L. 
11 Id., Ex. N. Importantly, the Neigum property did not touch on the Northern Road easement. 
12 Id., Ex. P. 
13 Complaint, ~ 37. 
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In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial 
court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in 
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court in its sound 
discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in 
part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair 
and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action 
and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
The determination of who is the prevailing party is committed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Rockefeller v.Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 82 P.3d 450 (2003). 
The legal basis for an award of costs is I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1). Some costs are awarded to a 
prevailing party as a matter of right, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C), and some costs can be 
awarded in the discretion of the Court, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). Discretionary costs are 
allowed "upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs teasonably 
incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." When 
objections to discretionary costs are made the Court "shall make express findings as to why such 
specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed." Such costs may also be 
disallowed without objection, in the discretion of the Court and upon express findings. The 
detennination of whether a cost is "exceptional" involves an evaluation both of the cost itself, 
i.e., whether it is the kind of cost commonly incurred in the type of litigation at issue, and 
whether the case itself is exceptional. City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P .3d 1118 
(2006); Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 109 P.3d 161 (2005); Fish 
v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 960 P.2d 175 (1998). 
The award of attorney fees is governed by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1), which provides that such an 
award is discretionary to the prevailing party "when provided for by any statute or contract." In 
addition, the rule provides that fees can be awarded, pursuant to I.e. § 12-121, when a court 
"finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
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unreasonable, or without foundation." Whether to award fees and the amount of the fees 
awarded are matters of discretion, unless it involves a specific determination of a statute which 
allows for attorney fees. Grover v. Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60,205 P.3d 1196 (2009); Taylor v. 
Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 201 P.3d 1282 (2009); Confreras v. R!-lbley, 142 Idaho 573, 130 P.3d 1111 
(2006). 
In exercising its discretion, the trial court must consider the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(3). Sanders v. Lanliford, 135 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823 (Ct.App.2000); Boel v. Stewart Title 
Co., 137 Idaho 9, 16,43 P.3d 768, 775 (2002); Brinkman v. Aids Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346, 
351, 766 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1988). The district court must, at a minimum, provide a record which 
establishes that the court considered these factors. Building Concepts, Ltd. v. Pickering, 114 
Idaho 640, 645, 759 P.2d 931,936 (Ct.App.1988). A trial court need not specifically address all 
of the factors contained in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) in writing, so long as the record clearly indicates that 
the court considered them all. Brinkman, 115 Idaho at 351, 766 P.2d at 1232. In addition, a 
court need not blindly accept those attorney fees requested by a party, and may disallow those 
fees that were incurred unnecessarily or unreasonably. Craft Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 
108 Idaho 704, 706, 701 P.2d 324,326 (Ct.App.1985). 
Poveys seek recovery of attorney fees on two statutory grounds, I.C. § 12-120(3) and I.C. 
§ 12-121. Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. 
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"A court is not required to award reasonable attorney fees every time a commercial 
transaction is connected with a case. The critical test is whether the commercial transaction 
comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; the commercial transaction must be integral to the claim 
and constitute a basis on which the party is attempting to recover." Bingham v. Montane 
Resources Assoc., 133 Idaho 420, 426, 987 P.2d 1035, 1041 (1999). The award of attorney fees 
is warranted when the commercial transaction comprises the crux of the lawsuit. Broods v. 
Gigray Ranches, Inc., 910 P.2d 744, 750 (1996). There is a two-part test in determining whether 
attorney fees are appropriate in a commercial transaction. "First, the commercial transaction 
must be integral to the claim, and second, the commercial transaction must provide the actual 
basis for recovery." Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 65 P.3d 509, 
515 (2003). If the complaint asserts a claim under a contract that qualifies as a commercial 
transaction under I.C. § 12-120(3), this statute must be applied even if no liability under the 
contract is established. Lexington Heights Develop. LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 287, 92 
P.3d 526, 537 (2004); Peterson v. Shore, 146 Idaho 476, 197 P.3d 789 (Ct.App.2008). Even 
when allowed under this statute, the amount of the award is within the discretion of the court. 
Johanneson v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 196 P.3d 341 (2008); Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 
425, 111 P.3d 110 (2005). 
As noted above, I.e. § 12-121 allows for the award of attorney fees if the court, in its 
discretion, determines that the action was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation. Joyce Livestock Co. v. u.s., 144 Idaho 1, 156 P.3d 502 
(2007); Tolley v. THL Co., 140 Idaho 253, 92 P.3d 503 (2004). When a case raised "fairly 
debatable questions" attorney fees should not be awarded. Sunnyside Indus. and Professional 
Park, LLC v. Eastern Idaho Public Health Dist., 147 Idaho 668, 214 P.3d 654, 660 
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(Ct.App.2009); Black v. Ameritel Inns, Inc., 139 Idaho 511, 515, 81 P.3d 416,420 (2003). "An 
action is not deemed to have been brought frivolously simply because it ultimately fails." 
Automobile Club Ins. Co., 124 Idaho at 879, 865 P.2d at 970; Edwards v. Donart, 116 Idaho 687, 
688, 778 P.2d 809, 810 (1989). In addition, the court reviews the entire case and determines 
whether all of it was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably and without 
foundation. If there is a legitimate matter raised, even though some matters were frivolous 
and/or unreasonable, attorney fees should not be awarded. Joyce Livestock Co., 144 Idaho at 16, 
156 P.3d at 517; Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 639, 132 P.3d 392, 396 (2006); McGrew v. 
McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 (2003). Again the amount to be awarded is 
within the discretion of the trial court. 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
I. Prevailing Party. 
The Court's first determination is whether there is a prevailing party. The Court notes 
that Garners do not make any argument that Poveys are not the prevailing party in this case. 
Nevertheless, the Court makes an independent review of the result to determine if Poveys 
prevailed. 
Clearly, Poveys' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in all material respects. 
However, as noted above, Poveys' position that Garners were not entitled to a particular 
easement in the Northern Road but only a reasonable access that Poveys could identify, was not 
sustained by the Decision. Garners efforts to have a judicial confirmation that they had a legal 
easement in the Northern Road was sustained by the Decision and was a relief sought against 
Poveys. Poveys did, at all times throughout thi~ litigation, concede some easement across their 
property in favor of Garners, and did prevail on ·any claim$ of interference, either physically or 
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by conveyance, with Garners' easements. In the exercise of its discretion, the Court concludes 
that Poveys are the prevailing party in this matter. 
II. Costs as a Matter of Right. Rule 54(d)(1)(C) lists the costs the prevailing party 
are entitled to as a matter of right. The only costs sought by Poveys as a matter of right are 
deposition expenses in the amount of $2359.75. At least two of these depositions were referred 
to and reviewed by the Court in ruling on the motions filed in this case. The Court finds that all 
these costs were reasonably incurred. Poveys are awarded $2359.75 in costs as a matter of right. 
III. Discretionary Costs. Discretionary costs are awarded if the Court finds that they 
were necessary, exceptional and reasonably incurred, and should, in the interests of justice, be 
assessed. The burden is on the party seeking the costs to make an adequate showing on all these 
elements, and the determination of whether to award such costs is within the Court's discretion. 14 
The costs Poveys seek in the discretionary category consist of $174.00 for faxes, $70.14 for 
postage, $.54 for long distance calls, $338.80 for photocopies, $1526.70 for on-line research, and 
$41.42 for overnight shipping expenses, totaling $2151.60. Garners specifically object to the 
on-line research expenses, asserting that most firms pay a flat rate for computer research and 
noting that no support is offered by Poveys for that expense. The Court does note that no 
particular argument or evidence is offered to support the discretionary expenses claimed. While 
the Court finds that the costs claimed are necessary and reasonable, in the ordinary course of 
defending this litigation, the Court cannot conclude that any of the discretionary expenses 
claimed are "exceptional." Property cases dealing with ownership, easements, boundaries, etc., 
are not particularly extraordinary and are c01l1II!-on in a rural state like Idaho. In addition, the 
expenses claimed are those typically and customarily incurred in the defense of such claims. 
14 Automobile Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 880, 865 P.2d 965,971 (1993); Beco Construction Co. v. 
Harper Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4, 11,936 P.2d 202, 209 (Ct.App. 1997). 
DECISION & ORDER-8 
Register No. CV -08-342 
There is no particular assertion here that would tum normal postage, shipping, copying, fax, and 
research expenses into exceptional ones. The request for discretionary costs is DENIED. 
IV. Attorney Fees. 
A. I.C. 12-121. Poveys assert that Garners' claim was brought against them 
frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. The Court has set forth the standard that 
applies to such a claim. In summary, a claim is not frivolous, unreasonable or without 
foundation just because it does not prevail or if the questions considered are fairly debatable. If 
anyone issue is legitimate, even if others are not, no attorney fees are awardable under this 
statute. 
This case raised important questions concerning the type of easements Garners had, what 
Poveys' responsibilities were regarding those easements, and whether Poveys had improperly 
interfered with those easements, either by physically plowing over them or in the conveyances to 
Dean, Neigum, and Viehweg. Poveys contended that they had the right to move Garners' 
easements to a different location, but they did not prevail on that issue. Poveys deed to Viehweg 
did not reference Garners' easements at all, leading Viehweg to believe there were no easements 
and that they could obstruct Garners' easements with a fence. While the Court concluded as a 
matter of law that Poveys had no duty with regard to the . Viehweg deed, Poveys' duty was a 
serious and debatable question. There was a paucity of cases dealing with the duties of the 
servient estate holder with regard to any duty to protect the holder of a prescriptive or prior use 
easement and the Court had to carefully analyze many cases to decide what the duty was and 
whether Poveys breached that duty. 
While the Court also concluded that the facts did not rise to the level to prevent summary 
judgment on the question of whether Poveys physically interfered with Garners' easements, a 
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careful analysis of those facts was necessary to reach that conclusion. The Court finds that the 
many questions discussed in this case about the scope of the easements and Poveys duties were 
"fairly debatable" and required substantial legal analysis for resolution. IS Under this standard, 
the Court is not left with the abiding belief that Garners' claim was pursued frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation. 
Poveys assert another basis for this part of their claim, i.e., that Garners' litigation tactics 
and motives were unreasonable. Poveys claim that Garners improperly failed to negotiate or 
agree to delay depositions while motions proceeded in this case, and that these tactics improperly 
increased the fees Poveys incurred. The Idaho Supreme Court has clearly held that the failure to 
negotiate a settlement is an improper basis for the award of attorney fees under I. C. § 12-121. 
Smith v. Angell, 122 Idaho 25, 830 P.2d 1163 (1992); Anderson v. Anderson, Kaufman, et. aI., 
116 Idaho 359, 775 P.2d 1201 (1989). See also Bosshardt v. Taylor, 104 Idaho 660, 661,662 
P.2d 241,242 (Ct.App.l983)("We have considered the possibility that the district judge intended 
to equate appellants' failure to enter into meaningful settlement negotiations with an 
"unreasonable" defense of the action .. .In our vi~w, one party's failure to negotiate does not, by 
itself, establish the opposing party's right to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121. An award of fees 
must be supported by a finding that one or more of the criteria prescribed by Rule 54(e)(1) have 
been satisfied.") Poveys have not cited any authority for their position that a failure to negotiate 
or some trial tactic can be a basis for a claim that a case is pursued frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation, and the Court has found none. The Court concludes that a claim under I.C. § 
15 Although not always factually similar, examples of cases where courts have found that claims related to 
easements or property ownership were not frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation include Estate of E.A. 
Collins v. Geist, 143 Idaho 821, 153 p.3d 1167 (2007); Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 
152 P.3d 575 (2007); Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 152 P.3d 2 (2006); and C&G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 
Idaho 763, 25 P.3d 76 (2001). 
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12-121 must be based on an analysis of the legal positions taken in the case, and not on 
extraneous factors. 
This analysis also applies to the last basis that Poveys assert, i.e., that Garners had an 
improper motive for bringing this claim, which was to rectify a problem or vendetta between 
Dan Gamer and Brad Povey that was unrelated to the easement. Poveys offer the affidavit of 
Jeffrey J. Neigum in support of this position. Garners move to strike the affidavit and offer a 
counter affidavit from Daniel Gamer on the issue. A motion to strike an affidavit is governed by 
1.R.C.P. 56 (e): "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Applying this standard, the Court 
GRANTS the Motion to Strike because the facts asserted in the affidavit are irrelevant to the 
question of whether Garners pursued this case frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. 
There may be a variety of motives for bringing any lawsuit, some appropriate and some not. But 
the only question to be considered by this Court is whether tpe legal theories and facts of the case 
were pursued in violation of the requirements ofI.C. § 12-121 and 1.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). The Court 
has concluded above that the issues raised in this case were fairly debatable and legitimate, even 
when resolved against Garners. Again, the Court is not left with the abiding belief that the case 
was pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. No attorney fees are awarded on 
this basis. 
B. I.e. § 12-120(3) - Commercial Transaction. "The test to determine whether 
[1. C. § 12-120(3)] applies is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the 
lawsuit; it must be integral to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the party is 
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attempting to recover. Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 432, 196 P.3d 341,350 (2008)." 
Troupis v. Summer, 148 Idaho 77, 218 P.3d 1138, 1141 (2009). 
Poveys first assert that because Garners alleged, in the Complaint, that this case involved 
a commercial transaction, it must be deemed one and attorney fees must be allowed to the 
'1' 16 prevru mg party. However, Garners correctly point to Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. 
Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 471, 36 P.3d 218, 223 (2001), where this same 
argument was made and rejected: 
There must be a commercial transaction between the parties for attorney fees to be 
awarded. To the extent that Magic Lantern Productions, Inc. v. Dolsot, 126 Idaho 805, 
808, 892 P.2d 480, 483 (1995) may be read to manaate an award of attorney fees to the 
prevailing party when the other party has claimed fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), that 
interpretation is disavowed. A prevailing party may rely on I.C. § 12-120(3) if pled by 
another party for recovery of attorney fees if it is warranted under the statute. "[AJ court 
is not required to award reasonable attorney fees every time a commercial transaction is 
connected with a case." Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 426, 
987 P.2d 1035, 1041 (1999)(citing Ervin Construction Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 
704, 874 P.2d 506,515 (1993)). [Emphasis added]. 
In short, it is not what is pled that is critical, but whether there is a commercial transaction that is 
integral to the claim and whether the commercial transaction is the basis for the result. Thus, the 
Court concludes that by simply pleading a commercial transaction in their Complaint, Garners 
have not conceded that a commercial transaction is the "gravamen" of this case. 
Turning to the substantive issue, there are two different lines of cases that have analyzed 
whether a commercial transaction is the "gravamen" of litigation involving real property 
questions. In the first group of cases, courts have found that a dispute over real estate did 
constitute a commercial transaction and have awarded attorney fees. For example, in Tro up is , 
the disputing parties owned real property in a partnership. The dispute involved an accounting of 
16 In the Complaint, ~ 37, Garners assert: "The purchase of the real estate by Gary and Nola from Povey Defendants 
was a commercial transaction under Idaho Code Sec. 12-120(3) so Plaintiffs, as successors to Gary and Nola, should 
be entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees from Defendants Brad Povey and Lezia Povey." 
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the division of common partnership expenses associated with the property. In finding that 
attorney fees should be awarded, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: "The Summers and Troupises 
owned the real property in question to conduct their business together. Therefore, the lawsuit 
was to recover on a commercial transaction and the Troupises are entitled to an award of attorney 
fees." 218 P.3d at 1141 (emphasis added). 
In Lexington Heights, the dispute was between two parties over the sale of real property 
to be developed into residential units. When the seller tried to increase the sales price and the 
buyer refused, the seller wouldn't sell and the suit was for the damages caused by that refusal 
and the subsequent sale to another party. Thus, the essence of the suit was over the provisions of 
the sales contract. In ruling that this was a case involving a commercial transaction, the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated: 
The purpose of the alleged Agreement was for Lexington Heights to acquire the ninety 
acres to develop it into a subdivision. Therefore, the alleged Agreement was a 
commercial transaction. Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 435, 80 P.3d 1031, 1036 
(2003); Taylor v. Just, 138 Idaho 137,59 P.3d 308 (2002); Farm Credit Bank o.fSpokane 
v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 869 P.2d 1365 (1994). Where a party alleges the existence 
of a contract that would be a commercial transaction under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), that 
claim triggers the application of the statute and the prevailing party may recover attorney 
fees even if no liability under the contract is established. Miller v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l 
Med. Ctr., Inc., 139 Idaho 825, 87 P.3d 934 (2004); Magic Lantern Prods., Inc., 126 
Idaho 805, 892 P.2d 480 (1995). 
140 Idaho at 287,92 P.3d at 537 (emphasis added). 
In Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 165 P.3d 261 (2007), a lender, 
Vanderford, brought suit to foreclose against real property offered as security for certain 
construction loans. In discussing the distinction between those real estate cases where fees are 
awarded and those where fees are not, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Some cases dealing primarily with property ownership and easement rights have not been 
considered commercial transactions. See Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 174-75, 16 
P .3d 263, 271-72 (2000) (boundary dispute is not commercial transaction because 
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relationship between the parties is not of a commercial nature where land owners are 
engaged in the businesses of ranching and farming). Such decisions stem from the idea 
that an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) is not appropriate every time a 
commercial transaction is remotely connected with the case. Sun Valley Hot Springs 
Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657, 663, 962 P.2d 1041, 1047 (1998). In this case the 
transactions involve accounts, notes, guarantees, and contracts for real estate 
development and sales are commercial transactions which constitute the gravamen of the 
lawsuit. The transactions in this case are dissimilar to land disputes between two 
neighboring businesses which the Court has previously held are not commercial 
transactions. 
144 Idaho at 559, 165 P.3d at 273 (emphasis added). 
In Hoffer v. Callister, 137 Idaho 291, 47 P.3d 1261 (2002), Hoffer purchased a 
commercial mobile home park from Callister. Hoffer later learned that the number of mobile 
homes in the park violated applicable zoning ordinances. Hoffer sued Callister and his 
predecessor seeking damages for breach of the real estate contract and breach of warranties 
associated with the deed of conveyance. At trial and on appeal Callister conceded that this case 
involved a commercial transaction and attorney fees were awarded. 
An example of the second line of cases is C&G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 25 P.3d 76 
(2001). In that case certain parcels of property were conveyed to the railroad by deed captioned 
"Right of Way Deed." Years later the railroad conveyed their interest in the property by quit 
claim deed. However, the plaintiff sued both the new owner and the railroad, asserting that the 
railroad's interest was only an easement, not fee simple. The railroad, who no longer owned the 
property, prevailed, but was denied any attorney fees, This case has, therefore, some significant 
factual similarities to the instant case. In affirming the district court's determination that no 
attorney fees should be awarded, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
The present action is primarily a dispute over whether the properties in question were 
conveyed in fee simple or as easements. As such, this case does not fall within the 
meaning of a commercial transaction as defined in I.C. § 12-120(3). The present situation 
is instead more analogous to situations involving the determination of property rights 
where this Court and the Court of Appeals have uniformly denied an award of attorney 
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fees. See Jerry J Joseph c.L. U Ins. Assoc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 789 P .2d 1146 
(Ct.App.1990) (denying attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) in an action where property 
owner sought a judgment compelling adjoining property owners to reimburse it for 
irrigation assessments, to record an instrument establishing an access easement, and to 
remove a fence hindering its use of the easement and where after settlement, adjoining 
property owners breached the settlement agreement); Chen v. Conway, 121 Idaho 1006, 
829 P.2d 1355 (Ct.App.1991) (determining that a quiet title action involving dispute over 
the existence of a prescriptive easement was not a commercial transaction under I.e. § 
12-120(3)); Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 785 P.2d 634 (1990) (holding that an 
action in which landowners sought adjudication of water rights and a permanent 
restraining order prohibiting the defendant from interfering with their diversion and use 
of water determined was not based on a commercial transaction as defined in I.C. § 12-
120(3)); Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657, 962 P.2d 1041 
(1998) (stating that an action to determine ownership and easement rights did not fall 
within the meaning of a commercial transaction under I.C. 12-120(3) and therefore 
attorney fees were properly denied). Accordingly, we decline to award fees to Union 
Pacific under I.C. § 12-120(3). 
135 Idaho at 769,25 P.3d at 82. 
Likewise, in Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000), one landowner sued 
the adjacent landowner claiming a new boundary by agreement or prescriptive use, although 
there never was any kind of express contract of sale between them. In ruling that no attorney 
fees could be awarded, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
The district court noted that both the Baxters and the Craneys are engaged in the 
businesses of ranching and farming, characterizing each party as being involved in a 
commercial endeavor. The district court, however, also summarily concluded that the 
relationship between the two parties was of a commercial nature. This simply is not the 
case. Idaho Code section 12-120(3) provides that attorney fees may be recovered by the 
prevailing party in a civil action to recover on "any commercial transaction." Id. The term 
"commercial transaction," as defined in I.C. § 12-120(3), includes all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. See id. This Court has previously 
recognized that "[a ]ttorney fees are not appropriate under I. C. § 12-120(3) unless the 
commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the 
party is attempting to recover." Brower v. E.L DuPont DeNemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 
784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990). 
The present case is analogous to others decided by this Court and the Court of Appeals 
involving the determination of property rights. See Jeny J Joseph c.L. U Ins. Assoc. v. 
Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 789 P.2d 1146 (Ct.App.l990) (denying attorney fees under I.e. § 
12-120(3) in an action where property owner sought a judgment compelling adjoining 
property owners to reimburse it for irrigation assessments, to record an instrument 
establishing an access easement, and to remove a fence hindering its use of the easement 
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and where after settlement, adjoining property owners breached the settlement 
agreement); Chen v. Conway, 121 Idaho 1006, 1012, 829 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Ct.App.), 
opinion on review, 121 Idaho 1000, 829 P.2d 1349 (1992) (determining that a quiet title 
action involving dispute over the existence of a prescriptive easement was not a 
commercial transaction under I.C. § 12-120(3»; Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 
785 P.2d 634 (1990) (holding that an action in which landowners sought adjudication of 
water rights and a permanent restraining order prohibiting the defendant from interfering 
with their diversion and use of water determined was not based on a commercial 
transaction as defined in I.C. § 12-120(3); Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 
131 Idaho 657, 962 P.2d 1041 (1998) (concluding that an action to determine ownership 
and easement rights did not fall within the meaning of a commercial transaction under 
I.C. 12-120(3) and therefore attorney fees were properly denied). Like the abov~ cases, 
this action is primarily a dispute over property ownership and easement rights and as such 
does not fall within the meaning of a commercial transaction as defined in I.C. § 12-
120(3) and as applied by the courts. 
135 Idaho at 174-75, 16 P.3d at 271-72. 
Finally, in Karterman v. Jameson, 132 Idaho 910, 980 P.2d 574 (Ct.App.1999), the 
dispute was for specific performance of a lease/option agreement. The seller refused to convey 
the property and the buyer sued. The seller prevailed on summary judgment and the district 
court awarded fees based on a commercial transaction. The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed, 
holding: 
A transaction involving the sale and purchase of personal residential property is not a 
"commercial transaction" within the meaning ofthe statute. Cj Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 
Idaho 293, 306, 900 P.2d 201, 214 (Ct.App.l995) (concluding where the purpose of a 
lease agreement was to operate a commercial cattle ranch, and the parties did not 
maintain a home on the ranch property, the lease was a commercial transaction and 
attorney fees were awardable pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3». Thus, because the lease-
option agreement at issue here involves the lease and purchase of a dwelling for 
residential purposes, attorney fees cannot be awarded pursuant to this section. 
132 Idaho at 916,980 P.2d at 580. 
What is the distinction between these two lines of cases and how are they to be applied to 
this case? This Court concludes that when there is a commercial relationship between the 
competing parties and/or the transaction in dispute is commercial in nature, then the courts have 
usually held that a commercial transaction is the gravamen of the matter and have awarded fees. 
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But when the transaction or the dispute is primarily involving a question of property ownership 
or property rights, the courts have concluded there is no commercial transaction and have not 
awarded fees. 
In this case, there clearly was no contract or transaction at all between D. Garner and 
Poveys. Although D. Garner asserted that Poveys had an obligation to honor and protect his 
easement when they acquired their property from McCullochs, the reality is that there never was 
any kind of commercial transaction between D. Garner and Poveys at all. It is very similar to 
C&G, Inc. v. Rule, where the railroad, as a prior owner of the property was sued for actions they 
took in transferring their interest. The same principle applies here. Thus, this Court easily 
concludes that there is no commercial transaction as it applies to any claim between D. Garner 
and Poveys and attorney fees would not be awarded against D. Garner. 
As to N. Garner, although there was a contract of sale between Poveys and N. Garner in 
1992, that contract was not what is commonly referred to as a commercial transaction, i.e., it 
conveyed real property without having any kind of unique commercial purpose. There never 
was a "commercial" relationship between N. Garner and Poveys upon which this claim was 
based. The primary purpose of this litigation was to confirm N. Garner's easement right and to 
seek damages if that right was lost or interfered with, either physically or by conveyance, by 
Poveys. This claim is far more similar to the second line of cases that have held that a 
commercial transaction was not the gravamen of the claim. 17 This Court concludes that the 
gravamen of this case was the determination of property rights. A commercial transaction was 
17 See, e.g., Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657, 663, 962 P.2d 1041, 1047 (1998) ("While 
the loan-mortgage transaction and the sale of Lot 44 are commercial transactions as defined in I.e. § 12-120(3), they 
are incidental to SVHS' claims. This action brought by SVHS is essentially an action whereby a landowner is 
attempting to enforce covenants against the owner of adjacent property. This case is analogous to holdings by this 
Court and the Court of Appeals involving the determination of property rights.") 
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not integral to the claim and was certainly not the basis for recovery. 18 Poveys prevailed, but not 
because of any commercial transaction or relationship. They prevailed because they did not 
breach any duty to Garners arising out of the easements Garners obtained by operation of law. 
To the extent that there was any commercial transaction involved in this case at all, it was 
incidental to the primary purpose of the litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Poveys are the prevailing parties and 
are entitled to costs in the amount of$2359.75 as a matter of right. The Court concludes that any 
discretionary costs are not "exceptional" and no such costs are awarded. The Court also 
concludes that this case was not pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation under 
I.e. § 12-121. Finally, the Court concludes that the gravamen of this litigation was the 
determination of property rights, and duties related thereto, and was not based on a commercial 
transaction under I.C. § 12-120(3). Therefore, no attorney fees are awarded to Poveys. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: March 9, 2010. 
STEPHEN S. DUNN 
District Judge 
18 Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 65 P.3d 509,515 (2003). 
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of the Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A 
Neigum Revocable Trust, dated September 
17, 2004; Jeffery J. Neigum and Kathleen A. 
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GARNER, husband and wife; NOLA GARNER a widow, and NOLA GARNER AS TRUSTEE 
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OF THE NOLA GARNER LIVING TRUST, dated July 19, 2007, AND THE PARTIES 
ATTORNEYS~ GORDON S. THATCHER MICHAEL W. BROWN, and JEFFREY D. 
BRUNSON, THATCHER, BEARD, ST. CLAIR, GAFFNEY. 116 S. Center, P.O. Box 216, 
Rexburg, Idaho, 83440, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellants, Brad Povey and Leiza Povey, husband and wife, 
appeal against the above-named Respondents, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
Memorandum Decision on Poveys Defendants' Motion for Costs and Fees entered in the above-
entitled act1.on on the day of March 9,201. 0, by the Honorable Judge Stephen S. Dunn presiding. 
2. That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the said 
Decision described in 11 above is an appealable decision under and pursuant to Rule 11 I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants then intend 
to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellants 
fTom asserting other issues on appeal, are as follows: 
(a) Whether the Trial Court erred in finding that a claim for relief Ul1der a warranty of 
title in a warranty deed conveying real estate for pUlposes of fanning and a gravel pit operation. 
was not an action on a commercial transaction for purposes of awarding attomey fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code section 12-120(3). 
(b) Whether the Trial Court erred in holding that the fact that an action was brought 
for an itnproper .purpose is not relevant to the inquiry under Idaho Code section 12~121 whether 
the action is being pursued frivolously~ unreasonably or without foundation. 
4. No order has been entered sealing aU or any portion of the record. 
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5. No reporter's transcript is needed or requested. 
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a. Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, filed lI29/09. 
b. Affidavit of Gordon S. Thatcher 111. Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to 
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d. Defendant: Dean, Hal J Appearance Blake S. Atkin, ftlod 2/4/09. 
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f. Memorandum in Support of Brad and Leiza Povey' 9 Motion to Dismiss Amended 
Complaint, filed 2/4/09. 
g. Defendant Brad and Leiza PoveY'sMotion to Dismiss Amended Complaint. flIed 
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h. First American Title Insurance Company's Notice of Non-Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, filed 219/09. 
1. Response to Defendant Poveys' Motion to Dismiss Amended Com.plaint, filed 
2/20/09. 
J. First American Title Insurance Company's Notice of Non-Opposition to 
Defendant Brad and Leiza Povey's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, filed 2/24/09. : 
k. DefendantS Brad and Leiza Povey's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Amended Complaint, filed 2/24/09. 
I. Court Minutes Hearing type: Motions Hearing date: 2/26/09 Time: 2:10 pm. 
3~S\ 
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m. Order, filed 3/6/09. 
n. Decision and Order on Povey Defendants Motion to Dismiss Amended 
Com.plaint, filed 3/13/09. 
o. Amended Complaint filed, dated 3/13/09. 
p. Second Amended Complaint, filed 3/30/09. 
q. Defendant: First American title Company, Inc., Appearance Ryan T. McFatland, 
dated 4/9/09. 
r. Notice of Appearance j filed 4/9/09. 
s. Povey Defendants' Answer to Second Amended Complaint, filed 4/9/09. 
1. Answer to Second Amended Complaint, filed 4/16/09. 
11. Order for Submission of Information, fued 9/2/09 .. 
v. Defendant Brad and Lei7...a Povey's Motion for Summary Judgment, flied 9/3/09. 
w. Memorandum in Support of Defendant Brad and Leiza Povey's Motion for 
Summary Judgm.ent, filed 9/3/09. 
x. Stipulated Statement, filed 9/16/09. 
y. Affidavit of Henry Povey, filed 9/23/09. 
z. Affidavit of Michael W. Brown, filed 9/23/09. 
aa. Affidavit of Daniel S. Garner, filed 9/23/09. 
bb. Motion for Leave to Amend Secotld Amended Complaint, filed 9/23/09. 
cc. Motion for Enlargement of Time, ftled 9/23/09. 
dd. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Affidavits of Ron Kendall, Ivan Jensen, Ted Rice, 
Lorraine Rice, and Judy Phillips, filed 9/23/09. 
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ee. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants 
Brad Povey and Leiza Povey, filed 9/23/09. 
ff. Povey Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Enlargement of 
Time, filed 9/29/09. 
gg. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to Amend Second Amended 
Complaint, filed 9/29/09. 
hh. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Ron Kendall, 
Ivan Jensen, Ted Rice, Lorraine Rice, and Judy Phillips, filed 9/29/09. 
11. Motion to Strike the Affidavits .of Henry 'povey and DanIel S. Gamer, filed 
9/29/09. 
jj. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike ·the Affida.vits of Henry Povey and 
Daniel S. Garner, filed 9/29/09. 
kk. Reply to Povcys' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion. for Leave to Amend 
Second Amended Complaint, filed 10/2/09. 
n. Second Affidavit of Michael W. Brown, filed 10/2/09. 
mm. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 1015/09. 
nn. Response to Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Henry Povey and Daniel S. 
Gamer, filed 10/5/09. 
00. Stipulation for. Dismissal with Prejudice, filed 10/8/09. 
pp. Order for Dismissal with Pr~iudice, filed 10/14/09. 
qq. Memorandum Decision on Povey Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed 10/27/09. 
------------------_._.  ... __ . __ .. -
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rr. Memorandwn of Costs Including Attorney Fees~ filed 11/9/09. 
55. Judgment, filed 11113/09. 
tt. Second Affidavit of Daniel S. Garoer, flled 11/23/09. 
UU. Motion to Disallow Costs, filed 1 i/23/09. 
vv. Affidavit of Jeffrey D. Brunson, filed 11123/09. 
ww. Reply Memorandwn of in Support of Mem.orandum of Costs Including Attorney 
Fees, filed 12/24/09. 
xx. Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin, filed 12/28/09. 
yy. Supplemental Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin in Support of Memorandum of Costs 
Including Attorney Fees, filed 12/28/09. 
ZZ. Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Jeffrey Neigum~ filed 12/29/09. 
aaa Memorandum in Opposition to Modon to Strike the Affidavit of Jeffrey J. 
Neigum, filed 116/10. 
bbb. Reply Memorandum Re: Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees, filed 1112110. 
ccc. Minute Entry and Order, filed 2/9110. 
ddd. Decision or Opinion, filed 3/911 O. 
eee. Notice of Appeal, filed 3/26/10. 
7. I certify 
(a) That a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on each 
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out 
below: N/A 
(b) That the reporter of the district eourt ha!'l been requested to provide the 
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estimated fee for preparation of the rep~rler' s transcript, but has advised the undersigned 
to send her a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal, upon which she will prepare an 
invoice of the estimated cost for preparation of the transcript, which amount shall then be 
paid to the reporter. N/A 
(0) That the estimated fee for preparation ofthe clerk's or agency's record has 
been paid. NI A 
(d) That the appellate fuing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20~ I.A.R. 
DATED this 30th day of April~ 2010. 
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Blake S. Atkin 
Attorney for the Povey Defendants 
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